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'Two Quagmires' looks at hard lessons of war
1:53 p.m., Feb. 23, 2007--A new book by a University of Delaware professor and combat veteran, A Tale of Two Quagmires: Iraq, Vietnam, and the Hard Lessons of War, considers the similarities between the two struggles and the difficulties of the current situation in Iraq, where America finds itself unable to secure a peace and also unable to leave. The author is Kenneth J. Campbell, UD associate professor of political science and international relations, who saw the quagmire in Vietnam up close and personal during 13 months of service, much spent near enemy lines as a Marine forward artillery observer. “I returned from Vietnam a changed person,” Campbell writes, adding that he “came home with a hunger to learn more about the politics of war and an obligation, as a survivor, to teach others about my experiences.” The book, by Paradigm Publishers, opens by framing the debate as to whether there are parallels between Vietnam and Iraq. Campbell looks at both sides and he concludes that “on the most important level, the strategic political level, Iraq and Vietnam are exactly alike.” He writes, “Both wars were constructed upon, and sustained by, a quicksand of conscious political deception. As such, they were and are quagmires.” Further, Campbell writes that the United States is destined to lose in Iraq and says the important question now is how much more the nation is prepared to pay. Most Americans turned against the war in Vietnam following the Tet offensive in 1968, he writes, and yet the nation remained at war, absorbing huge losses, for another five years. The book details Campbell's personal experiences in Vietnam, and his later conversion to “antiwarrior” as a member of Vietnam Veterans Against the War, before chapters that chronicle the processes that led America into Vietnam and Iraq and the lessons we can learn from both conflicts. Hard-learned lessons from Vietnam were formally outlined in a doctrine set forth by Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of Defense under President Ronald Reagan, in 1984. Weinberger said the six conditions for the use of force are that U.S. vital interests must be at stake, there must be a clear commitment to victory, political and military objectives must be made clear, military forces must be of the proper size, public and congressional support must be secured and force must be the last resort. Campbell writes that those lessons were applied, even in the Persian Gulf War under President George H.W. Bush, but were discarded by neo-conservatives in the current administration of President George W. Bush as they pressed for a war of choice, rather than necessity, in Iraq. As in Vietnam, he writes, America entered the Iraq war under a veil of deception that continued with misleading statements about the progress of the conflict and prospects for its resolution. He writes that he believes the U.S. must now reinforce four key lessons learned in Vietnam and reaffirmed in Iraq--the limitations of military force; the continuing relevance of international law, especially as it pertains to war; the importance of preserving Constitutional law; and the importance of multilateralism in foreign policy. “Only by relearning and reteaching these crucial lessons can we help our children and their children avoid bloody quagmires in the future,” Campbell concludes. The book has received praise in advance of its publication. Retired Army Lt. Gen. William E. Odom, a senior fellow with the Hudson Institute and former director of the National Security Agency during the Reagan Administration, said, “The plethora of best-selling new books on the Iraq War today merely catalogues the tactical errors and leaves the false impression that had the war been fought differently, victory would have been achieved and U.S. interests advanced. Campbell's lucidly written comparison of the wars in Vietnam and Iraq shows how costly this illusion is, a deception consciously fostered by American leaders and cheerleading members of the Fourth Estate.” W.D. Ehrhart, author of Vietnam Perkasie: A Combat Marine Memoir, said, “Anyone who wants to understand two of the greatest debacles of my generation, how they relate to each other, and what we might do to avoid future such failures, needs to read this book.” “America's aspirations as a moral nation depend on voices like Ken Campbell's, voices that challenge conventional wisdom, generate debate, and put into motion the forces of self-correction that keep us true to the best of our values and traditions,” Joel H. Rosenthal, president of the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs, said. Born and raised in Philadelphia, Campbell received his bachelor's degree in history from Temple University in 1975. He worked as a factory quality-control inspector, a shipyard painter, a taxi driver, a bus driver and a hospital respiratory-therapy technician for eight years before he returned to Temple to pursue graduate work in political science. He earned a master's degree in 1985 and a doctoral degree in 1989. His dissertation explored the U.S. military's lessons in Vietnam. Campbell joined the UD faculty in 1990. Article by Neil Thomas |
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