To paraphrase my senior honors thesis advisor, Kemal Karpat, rare is the historical epoch that has not been fundamentally affected by migration. Yet, in post-WWII twentieth century Europe, during what the French call “les trentes glorieuses” (1945-1975), migration was largely viewed as an economic phenomenon without much political significance, to say nothing of strategic import. This viewpoint would begin to change in the 1970s. By the 1980s, with the emergence of the National Front, the significance of migration as a political issue could no longer be ignored. By the 1990s, migration policy underwent securitization and began to be viewed as relevant, indeed central, to French national security policy. In the past decade, and especially since 9/11 and 3/11 2004 in Madrid, migration and integration of Islamic communities largely created by post-WWII migration have become matters of vital concern. Integration of Islamic communities in Europe now constitutes a strategic imperative because non-integration or alienation of Muslims in Europe bears importantly on the outcome of the War on Terrorism. What had changed? What explains the transformation of migration from a non-issue into a matter vitally affecting security?
To elucidate this puzzle, and focussing principally on France for reasons of parsimony, I review three consecutive periods in French immigration history: the recruitment era, the stabilization period and the last decade in which migration is clearly linked to security policy. The transformation does not occur overnight, but over decades. And the roots of France’s contemporary security dilemma can be traced back to colonialism and the last quarter of the nineteenth century when France’s chronic demographic insufficiency, among other factors, had already made France into a land of immigration.
The most recent period is demarcated by the apparent overspill of civil war in Algeria to French soil. In the early 1990s, perceived growing insecurity emerged as a major concern for French voters. Then members of the Armed Islamic Group (AIG), a faction fighting in Algeria, began a bombing campaign in metropolitan France. French citizens of North African Muslim background were involved. Another group of French Muslim radicals launched bomb attacks in Morocco. Many French scholars now believe that the Algerian government had successfully infiltrated the AIG and thus was able to manipulate the commandos involved in the attacks on French soil. Be that as it may, by 1995, Islamist terrorism had become the central concern in French foreign and national security policy.
Subsequent events, such as the March 11, 2004 bombings in Madrid, make assessment of the threat emanating from Islamic communities in France and elsewhere in Europe unavoidable. Scholars like Olivier Roy view Al Qaeda as a primarily European political movement. It is known that hundreds of alleged Islamic radicals have been detained by European authorities since 9/11. Hundreds of Muslim volunteers are thought to be fighting U.S. forces in Iraq where a number have been killed or captured. Young French Muslims are thought to be involved in the growing number of attacks against Jews and Jewish institutions in France which is part of a Europe-wide resurgence of anti-Jewish violence.
Like French scholars such as Jocelyne Cesari, Gilles Kepel and Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, I believe that the appeal of groups like Al-Qaeda among French Muslims is quite limited. The vast majority of French Muslims reject the Islamism embraced by a fringe. Yet, like other post-industrial democracies, France is very vulnerable to political violence by tiny minorities.
While heightened security vigilance is warranted, integration of Muslims in France and throughout Europe should help limit the appeal of radical Islam. Security-driven measures that alienate Muslims or discriminate against them risk proving counter-productive. Moreover, the integration of Muslim communities in Europe must be fostered in a broader, transnational context. Europe is part of the Umma. Events adversely affecting Muslims in the Islamic periphery of Europe in particular can significantly influence integration of Islamic communities in Europe. Resolution of the conflicts in Iraq and in Israel/Palestine would lessen the appeal of radical Islamists and contribute to integration of Muslims in Europe.
By 1970, when I first stepped foot in France, Islam had become the second most adhered to religion in France. Most Muslims in France had arrived after 1945, but not all by any means.
Few recall today that France proclaimed itself an Islamic Republic in the 1920s. Algiers and Oran were as French as Lyon and Marseilles. Algerian nationalist aspirations remained embryonic. World War I and chronic shortages of labor in agriculture and certain industrial sectors had brought significant numbers of Arab and Berber Muslims from Algeria and Morocco as soldiers and workers to metropolitan France. The Third Republic legalized out of status workers from Morocco during the Popular Front, marking the start of a public policy path dependency that endures still today. In Lyon, the Guillotiére neighborhood underwent a transformation from predominantly Italian to Arab in the 1920s and 1930s, just as today it is changing from Arab to Chinese.
On V-E Day, 1945, the bloodshed in Setif marked the beginning of strife in Algeria. But few could foresee the war that would begin in 1954 and its outcome by 1962. Near the end of World War II, the great demographer Alfred Sauvy would call for massive immigration to restore France’s demographic well-being. He advocated admission of millions of immigrants. There existed a broad consensus in government circles on the need for immigration for demographic purposes, a trait that distinguished French migration policies from those pursued elsewhere in Europe.
The French government created a new agency to regulate migration, the National Immigration Office, and endowed it with a legal monopoly over recruitment of foreign workers. The postwar tripartite government, which included ministers from the French Communist Party, intended to prevent abuses of foreign labor that had been widespread during the interwar period. Recruitment and employment of foreign labor was to be regulated on the basis of bilateral labor agreements that would protect the interests of all parties involved, including those of the homelands. The plan was to recruit workers from nearby European lands, like Italy, with populations viewed as culturally close to the French. There was no expectation for large-scale recruitment in predominantly Muslim countries.
Post World War II plans for migration largely did not work as foreseen. The National Immigration Office existed more on paper than in reality. Many French employers ignored regulations and began to hire technically illegal workers on the spot. These workers would then be legalized. Between 1945 and 1975, about two-thirds of all migrants legally-admitted to France were admitted through legalization procedures. With the onset of the Cold War and the Marshall Plan, the tripartite government broke up and the French Communist Party fell out of power until 1981. Immigration policy and especially the status of foreign workers quickly became a non-issue.
Meanwhile, it had become easier for Algerian Muslims to travel to metropolitan France. The onset of the war of independence in 1954 increased the internal migration across the Mediterranean. What had become the French Muslim community of North African background figured importantly in the outcome of the conflict in Algeria. Many French citizens of Algerian Muslim background would opt to retain their French citizenship under the terms of the Evian Accords, which led to Algeria’s independence in 1962.
In 1964, France signed its first bilateral labor accord with newly independent Algeria. The status of Algerian workers in France differed from that of all other foreign workers admitted by the National Immigration Office. In the 1960s, France signed a host of bilateral labor agreements including accords with predominantly Muslim states like former protectorates Tunisia and Morocco, as well as with the Turkish Republic. Thus, it was that Islam would become the second religion of France, but not of the French, by 1970.
During the 1950s and 1960s, very little attention was paid to immigration. It might best be described as a non-issue. Integration of immigrants constituted at best a neglected issue. According to the late Georges Tapinos, France evolved a dual policy, one that favored settlement of migrants from Italy, Spain and Portugal and a temporary foreign worker policy for Muslim migrants from North Africa.
In retrospect, the neglect of immigrants and of migration policy appears shocking. But as late as 1970 issues like discrimination and racism associated with migration were only dimly perceived. For the most part, foreign workers were invisible to the general population. There was little awareness of migrant living conditions, their disproportionally high accident rates or of their growing significance in overall employment. It is important to recall that many foreign workers had seasonal or short-term legal status. The presumption was that most would repatriate. This view was comforted by policies touted by homelands such as Algeria and Turkey which embraced policies of return.
In 1964, in neighboring Switzerland, a Swiss sociologist had coined a new term, Heim-kehrillusion, to refer to the growing discrepancy between migrant expectations of repatriation and the reality of their extended residency. By the 1970s, early French students of migration discovered a similar pattern of illusion of return.
The neo-fascist New Order began to organize rallies against immigration sauvage or uncontrolled migration by 1970. Although New Order probably consisted of no more than five or six hundred members, its rallies virtually always prompted violent counter-demonstrations. Such protests, along with the May-June 1968 events, served to politicize migration issues.
From 1968 on, awareness of the misery of the lives of many immigrants began to grow. The revolutionary Extreme Left in particular began to embrace foreign worker causes whether wildcat strikes or marches in favor of legalization. Stephen Castle’s New Left Review article in which he termed bidonville a French word for hell was emblematic of the emerging prise de conscience.
As a student who spent a great deal of time living and working in France from 1970 to 1976, I recall reading with numbing regularity about deaths of migrants due to fires or asphyxiation. Bodies of Arab workers were regularly fished out of French rivers. All of these were listed as faits divers, as odds and ends, in Le Monde. Then, one such event, the discovery of four asphyxiated Maliens in Aubervilliers near Paris became a cause célèbre. In the following months, the French press was inundated with articles and exposés about migration. In 1972 and 1973, violence perpetrated against Arabs sparked major protests. In 1973, Algeria unilaterally suspended further recruitment of its citizens for employment in France following a deadly bombing of the Algerian consulate in Marseilles.
It was against a backdrop of growing criticism of governmental inattention to social issues related to migration, heightened politicization of migration and a disturbing upswing in violence directed against Arabs that the French government suspended most further foreign worker recruitment in 1974. Contrary to the view that the curb was due to the oil price crisis linked to the 1973 Middle East War, the French government changed migration policy in order to reassert control over migration.
The cumulative effect of decades of governmental neglect was an enormous socio-political problem in France and the rest of Western Europe akin to what Gunnar Myrdal termed the American dilemma. Muslims comprised a large part of the disadvantaged immigrant population. There were also French citizens of Islamic background, such as the Harki soldiers who fought on the side of France in Algeria and their families who were also disadvantaged. There would be long-term consequences for Islamic communities in France.
Resentment over the status afforded Muslim workers back in the 1950s and 1960s lingers still today. This can be seen in the remarkable three-part documentary film by Yamina Benguigui entitled Mémoires d’Immigres. The alienation and humiliation felt by so many immigrant Muslim workers haunts their children and can weaken the propensity of the second or third generations to integrate. A number of Islamists arrested by French police have voiced grievances over the treatment afforded their parents and grandparents.
In sum, the period from 1945 to 1975 began with a plan for mass migration that went awry due to the consequences of the Algerian war of national liberation, the unexpected settlement of many supposedly temporary migrants and governmental shortcomings in regulation of migration. For the most part, the French government neglected migration, thereby allowing very adverse conditions to become commonplace as suggested by the proliferation of bidonvilles (or Hoovervilles) by 1970. France’s rapidly growing Muslim population was disproportionally adversely affected.
By virtually all measures, there had developed an enormous integration deficit. Muslim migrants in particular endured high employment accident rates, residency insecurity, racist violence and socio-economic marginalization. Many Muslim workers had been selected for recruitment for their physical prowess or their socio-political backwardness rather than on integration criteria. The measures designed to protect foreign workers, such as the requirement for employers to ensure provision of adequate housing prior to hiring, were largely ignored.
Migration policies in Western and Northern Europe circa 1975 converge around curtailment of further recruitment of (non-Community) foreign workers, grudging acceptance of family integration as well as the need for integration policies and new initiatives directed against illegal migration. France declared a halt to routine legalization in 1972 but nevertheless has had recurrent legalization episodes ever since. It inaugurated integration policies in the mid-1970s and created a minister in charge of immigration affairs. In 1972, it also began a campaign against illegal migration that is considerably more credible and coherent than the US counterpart begun at roughly the same juncture.
French integration policies as late as 1984 were characterized by ambivalence particularly toward settlement of Muslims. Valery Giscard-d’Estaing served as President from 1974 to 1981. One of his top priorities involved repatriation of Algerian workers and their families with temporary residency and employment status.
Prior to 1973, very few foreigners were unemployed in France. However, foreign workers suffered disproportionally during the economic restructuring from the mid 1970s to the 1980s. Unable to coax the Algerian government into implementing its longstanding policy of return, the conservative coalition government launched a two pronged campaign to secure repatriation through cash incentives for return and to upgrade blue collar employment conditions so as to reduce dependency on foreign labor. Neither of the complementary initiatives achieved the results desired. Very few foreigners opted for voluntary repatriation because they knew that prospects for employment were even worse back home. The bulk of migrants who did accept repatriation were Spaniards and Portuguese, not North Africans. (Ironically, these returnees later regained legal access to France and the rest of the European Community.)
The only option left to the French government was systematic non-renewal of permits which figured centrally in badly strained Franco-Algerian bilateral discussions. Mass mobilizations in defense of Algerian workers and striking residents of the Sonacotra housing units for foreign workers, which included many Algerians, thwarted the French government. After the Left’s victories in the 1981 presidential and parliamentary elections, a left-wing French government would similarly seek to induce repatriation through financial incentives, albeit on better terms for the foreigners. But this initiative too would yield meager results. In 1984, Socialist Prime Minister Michel Rocard successfully engineered a national dialogue by all French parties, with the notable exclusion of the National Front, which reached a consensus against involuntary repatriation of legally-admitted resident aliens. But, for nearly a decade after the onset of integration policy, the issue of cash incentives for repatriation and the possibility of non-renewal of residency authorization for Algerians had cast a long shadow.
The process of family reunification that had begun long before the 1974 curbs continued after them. France’s Muslim population became younger and more feminine as a result. This period also witnessed a remarkable affirmation of Islam, witnessed in statistics on construction of mosques and prayer halls, as well as in the creation of Islamic associations. The children born to Algerian couples living in France automatically became French if their parents were born in what had been France till 1962. The relative ease of naturalization and French nationality acquisition meant that Islam became the second religion of the French during the period.
Four other developments also importantly affected integration. Skyrocketing unemployment disproportionally affecting Muslims proved to be durable and especially adversely affected Muslims. There was growing evidence of employment discrimination against Muslim job-seekers. The emergence of the National Front in municipal elections in Dreux in 1983 and in the 1986 parliamentary elections both adversely affected the integration climate while lending a new urgency to it. About one third of the French electorate sympathized with the National Front’s immigration policy program which aimed, above all, to secure repatriation. Not surprisingly, the program also envisaged increased temporary foreign worker admissions. The increase in asylum-seeking in the 1980s brought new waves of Muslim migrants to France, many fleeing political instability in the Middle East. Individuals from predominantly Islamic countries also figured importantly in periodic legalizations which attested to the continuation of illegal migration despite reinforced French governmental efforts to curb it.
While stabilization of overall immigration was achieved during this period, progress on the integration front was uneven. The curtailment of seasonal foreign worker admissions (principally from Morocco) was consistent with integration policy as was the adoption of the voluntary repatriation principle. Legally-admitted aliens and their dependents became more secure. As family reunification progressed, second and third generations emerged, which included many French citizens. Despite legal equality, many encountered problems and barriers in education and employment. Heavily immigrant-background neighborhoods sometimes erupted into violence, as relations between French police and beurs, slang for Arabs, often were strained. Growing juvenile delinquency in suburbs surrounding major French cities fuelled a growing sense of insecurity.
Since the late 1980s, I have been asked from time to time to offer an assessment of the overall state of Muslim integration in European states, and particularly in France. I usually begin with several caveats. I note that it is extremely difficult to generalize about Muslims in Europe because they are characterized by extraordinary heterogeneity. Some European Muslims are indigenous and conversions to Islam are not uncommon. Converts appear disproportionally drawn to radical Islam. I also point out that estimates of Islamic populations in various European states vary widely. Some French scholars use the figure of five million Muslims in France, while others use four. Perhaps the best known French expert on integration contests such figures on the grounds that they do not sufficiently reflect secularization of Islamic communities, such as the Algerian and especially Berber population. I see no need to criticize further scholars who generalize about Muslims on the basis of putatively shared culture. Others, such as Olivier Roy, have already done so convincingly. A final caveat pertains to legal barriers in some European countries like France which prohibits asking questions about religion and race in censuses.
The gist of my assessment is one of cautious optimism that the overall trend is toward greater integration, in France and in the rest of Europe. But evidence of integration is far from uniform and there remains much to worry about over the conditions of Muslims in Europe. The number of Turks in Germany, for instance, who cannot speak German remains about what it was twenty years ago.
In the French case, most Muslims are now French citizens. According to the most important survey research on French Muslims, most speak French and identify French as their language. Some 87 percent of young Algerians identify French as their language while only 30 percent identify Arab or Berber as their language. Concerning religion, almost half of Algerians are not religious, 29 percent practice their religion regularly and 23 percent sometimes. Secularism is very developed in the Berber community whereas Moroccans are more faithful than Algerians.
Intermarriage and dating with French citizens is common. About half of Algerian-background men live with a French person and about one quarter of Algerian-background women live with a French man. Family control over marriage, which is prevalent in North Africa, is weakening. There are relatively few arranged marriages.
Voter registration among sons of Algerian couples stands at 63 percent against the French average of 87 percent. There are very few French elected officials of immigrant-background.
On the educational and housing fronts, some progress has been made, particularly by immigrant-background women. The bans on veils and other ostentatious religious symbols have affected several hundred girls. Immigrant-background populations disproportionally live in modest and substandard public housing, but the housing situation has evolved positively since the heyday of the bidonville.
Unemployment and employment discrimination constitute the major barriers to integration. About half of all North African Muslim-background males are unemployed for over a year. Recent studies have documented a previously undiagnosed nation-wide problem of employment discrimination against French citizens and legally resident aliens of Arab background in particular. School failure and unemployment help foster juvenile delinquency and sometimes adherence to radical Islamist tenets. A very high proportion of the incarcerated population in France is of immigrant background and, somewhat like the case of Ali la Pointe depicted in the film the Battle of Algiers, prisons have become incubators of radical Islamism.
On the whole, though, French Muslims embrace republican and democratic ideals. Even among Islamic fundamentalists in France, only a fringe are drawn to Al Qaeda-style politics. Most are other world-focussed and largely apolitical.
Nevertheless, hundreds if not thousands, of French Muslims have joined Al-Qaeda or other radical Islamic organizations. French authorities have foiled a number of planned attacks. A key French intelligence agency, the Direction Centrale des Renseignements Generaux , has detected 541 Salafist activists on French soil and over 5,000 militants and sympathizers. They control about forty mosques and prayerhalls and have sought to take control of forty other Islamic sites. Salafists claim to interpret Islam as did the Prophet. Not all Salafists become Jihadists, but many of the latter first become Salafists. In 2000, Salafist activists were detected in only six regions of France. Now they are present virtually throughout France.
Muslims in France are influenced by trends affecting the Islamic world. Olivier Roy argues that Islamic radical politics has lost revolutionary potency as major Islamist movements have moderated and become national-oriented, conservative-style political parties. Roy is struck by the parallels between radical Islamists in the twenty-first century and the 1968 era revolutionaries. There are indeed striking similarities between the terrorism of the 1960s and 1970s and that of the new century.
The nature of the threat posed by Islamic extremism in France and throughout Europe should neither be underestimated nor exaggerated. Grievances arising from immigration history do play a role in the appeal of radical Islam as do grievances over the war in Iraq and the situation in Israel/Palestine. Just how importantly such factors weigh as compared to classic measures of integration like education, housing and employment is unclear. The good news is that European governments and political elites now view immigrant integration in a different, strategic way. The bad news is signs of growing Islamophobia.
The new generations of French Muslims with different ideas and more visible forms of religiosity than the older generation now predominate. Most seek to reconcile their Islamic faith and identity with French citizenship in ways that have produced a novel kind of Islamic-Republican citizenship. As a result, both Islam and France have changed.
The 1960s-1970s generation of mainly far left groups and movements that engaged in armed struggle in Western Europe, with a few exceptions, proved short-lived. The fate of the Red Army Faction born of German student protests against imperialism is emblematic.
Now, Europe again constitutes but one front in a global struggle, this time pitting Al-Qaeda and its allies against “Jews and Crusaders”. President Bush enlarged the scope of the conflict with his declaration of war against terrorism.
Many European, and not a few American, students of terrorism believe that the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 enhanced the appeal of radical Islam in Europe and elsewhere around the world because it seemed to confirm Osama Bin Laden’s view of the U.S. as an aggressor against and oppressor of Muslims. The flow of French Muslim volunteers to Iraq tends to lend credence to this interpretation. It underscores the significance of the role that human agency and leadership will play in the future as well.
Sociological studies of Muslim integration into societies like France are indispensable but incomplete. They inform us about how Muslim kids are faring in schools and on job markets and who they are dating and marrying. The overall picture is a mixed one, and there are analysts who disagree that the overall trend is positive. My review of the scholarly literature at this juncture is incomplete so I hasten to add provisional to my viewpoint. Thus far, I have found nothing to alter my evaluation of the prospect for Islamic extremism in Europe presented prior to 9/11. The war in Iraq, like Arab-Israeli conflict, has a radicalizing effect on certain elements of France’s Muslim populations, especially teenagers, but this does not seem to alter the big picture regarding prospects for Jihadism.
Immigration history suggests that Islamic waves of migrants in the post-World War II era will slowly but steadily integrate. The children and grandchildren of the migrants are mainly French citizens and they often know little about the homelands of their mothers or grandfathers. There is no reason to believe that the Islamic faith of these new generations will alter the historic pattern.
Childbearing by immigrant-background women has helped the French campaign for demographic well-being over the past half century. This and continuing legal and illegal migration means that the Muslim population of France is likely to continue to grow in the future. Across the Mediterranean, largely Islamic societies in North Africa are experiencing trends similar to those in Mexico that have so affected the U.S. in recent years. Birthrates in North Africa have fallen but there are huge cohorts coming into work forces during the first decade of the new century. The size of the cohorts will recede after 2010. This demographic situation virtually ensures that trans-Mediterranean migration will continue to augment the Muslim populations of Europe over the short to the medium term. The concomitant aging of many European societies may also influence European immigration policies in the future.
Similar to the NAFTA between the U.S., Mexico and Canada, the European Union has signed partnership agreements with most Arab states on the Mediterranean littoral. These agreements have liberalized trade between the partners and has brought European and Arab states together into the Barcelona Process, which, created in 1995, aims to create a sphere of prosperity around the Mediterranean.
Immigration issues have loomed large in frequently contentious negotiations between Arab and EU partners in the Barcelona Process. The EU wants states like Morocco to prevent illegal migration across the Gibraltar whereas Morocco wants better treatment for its over two million expatriates in the EU area. Another reason to expect further immigration from the Arab littoral northward derives from Philip L. Martin’s migration hump theory. Trade liberalization will increase emigration from a less-developed area to a more developed area over the short to medium term before reducing it over the long-term.
EU states will not however be overrun by uncontrollable hordes of migrants from North Africa. That scenario is about as remote as the scenario of a Fortress Europe, hermetically sealed off to international migration. France granted 216,000 first-time residency permits to aliens in 2003, most of which facilitated family reunification.
In the wake of the U.S. and allied invasion of Iraq, the U.S. has begun its Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and the President has called for a broader initiative which would promote democracy and socio-economic betterment through the Middle East. Although embryonic, this initiative could improve perceptions of the U.S. and dampen the sense of grievance that fans Jihadism in Europe and elsewhere. Close and effective EU and U.S. cooperation on democratization and improvement of socio-economic conditions in the Middle East most likely cannot be achieved as long as the conflicts in Iraq and Israel/Palestine continue.
In the war against Al-Qaeda and its allies, something quite different from that conjured up by the President’s War against Terrorism, the Muslims of Europe have become a strategic stake. Their “hearts and minds” vitally affect international security in the twenty-first century. The past insecurity of so many Muslims in Europe and their sufferings there haunt post 9/11 and 3/11 Europe. But, as far as I can ascertain, there is no reason not to expect the Jihadists to go the way of the RAF and the Red Brigades.
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Jihad: the Trail of political Islam, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002.
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Roy, Olivier, Globalized Islam: The Search for a new UMMAH, New York: Columbia University Press, 2004.
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Crul, Maurice and Hans Vermeulen, eds., The Future of the second gerneration: The integration of migrant youth in six European countries, International Migration Review, 37:4., Winter 2003.
Buljs, Frank J. and Jan Rath, Muslims in Europe: The State of Research, Russell Sage Foundation, New York, October, 2002
http://64.207.171.242/pages/cesari.html
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/front Al-Qaeda in Europe aired January 25, 2005
http://www.insna.org/INSNA/Hot/terrorist.htm
Benguigui, Yamina, Memoires d’Immigres, www.facsea.org, Hate, L’Esquive,
Voyage of Hope (Reise der Hoeffnung)
URL of this page: http://www.udel.edu/poscir/faculty/MMiller/inauguraladdress.htm