Emissions trading policies are most feasible when pollutants
are localized rather than widely dispersed across large regions.
In fact, localized controls may actually generate regional problems.
For example, local SO2 emissions controls have induced
firms to build tall smokestacks so that SO2 emissions
are carried beyond the zone of control and create acid rain
far downwind. Federal regulation of acid rain has been controversial
because it pits the high-sulfur coal industry in the "Rust
Belt" against forestry, aesthetics and outdoor recreation
in the Northeast. Midwest electricity rates will rise as utilities
install "scrubbers" to reduce SO2 emissions
and/or purchase emissions reduction credits from other Midwest
utilities (as allowed under the new revisions to the Clean Air
Act.)
Some pollutants are dispersed globally, and require international
controls. For example, CFC's are blamed for ozone depletion
(ground-level ozone is a pollutant, but ozone in the stratosphere
filters out harmful solar UV radiation). 59 countries have signed
a 1990 treaty agreeing to phase out CFC's entirely by 2000, and
established a fund to subsidize LDC phase-outs of these chemicals.
The US is using a marketable permit system for CFC's: permits
will be phased out gradually. Windfall profits accruing to permit-holders
are captured by an excise tax on CFC's.
Greenhouse gases (e.g., CO2, methane) supposedly
trap excess solar heat in the earth's atmosphere, causing global
warming and climatic disruptions. There is a lot of scientific
controversy about whether we are actually experiencing global
warming or not, and about how much warming (if any) is due to
human causes.
Various solutions are under discussion: UN-administered taxes
on all industries which generate greenhouse gases, so that industries
internalize the full environmental cost of their emissions; international
subsidies for reforestation and rainforest protection to absorb
more CO2 in vegetation; the development of an international
market in greenhouse gas emissions permits. An international
permit market can only succeed if emissions permits are accepted
as permanent, quantifiable and enforceable worldwide.
Although uncertainty about global warming is very high, Tietenberg notes that the risks of being wrong about it are asymmetric: excess control of greenhouse gases will retard global economic growth, while too little control could result in global disaster. Note that the very long time horizons of the global warming problem make conventional benefit-cost analyses unreliable (see Example 16.2: the PV of world GNP 100 years from now at current interest rates is only about $1 million!); we need to factor in a little more atruism for future generations. At the very least, we need to eliminate market distortions that actually promote the generation of greenhouse gases. Solving these global pollution problems will require unprecedented international cooperation.