This book seems to attempt to do several things. It proposes a new language for discussing ki phenomena and serves as a critique of the Western scientific method, and in doing so it engages in a certain amount of comparative or cross-cultural philosophy of science. These various endeavors are met with varying degrees of success.
The primary project involves an analysis of the phenomenon described as Ki-energy. This concept is found in some form or another and is called by a variety of names in a number of traditional yogic and medical technologies. Counterparts to Ki from other cultural traditions would be, for example: qi from the Chinese tradition; prana from the Indian traditions; nefesh or ruach from the Hebrew traditions; and so on. Phenomenologically, this life force accounts for the activity and "living-ness" of living things. The attempt to conserve and cultivate this life force informs many yogic systems.
Yuasa sees ki-energy as occupying a middle ground between subjectivity and objectivity. He suggests that it mediates between body and mind, ostensibly coordinating the two. Although Yuasa claims that this overcomes the body-mind dualism characterized by Western science, I will point out shortly that this claim is somewhat premature.
Yuasa's critique of the Western scientific paradigm is primarily based on the observation that the Western paradigm excludes subjective observations and variables from its analysis of data. He feels that the greatest contribution which can be made to modern culture by an increased appreciation of Ki-phenomena is the restoration of the subjective element into scientific analysis. This is a point well-taken, but not necessarily well-made.
There are several problems with the very conception of the project. One major problem is the extent to which the author and/or translators are guilty of reductionism and over-generalization. For one thing, the ambitions of the book seem somewhat simplistic. According to the introduction, the basic questions Yuasa is asking are: 1) "Is it not time now to articulate the essential philosophical reason for the current global situation?"; 2) "Can we not trace it to views of human nature and the world espoused by the modern Western paradigm of scientific thinking?"; and 3) "Can East Asia make any significant contribution to tackling this issue?" (p.x).
These questions are problematic for a number of reasons. Question 1 seems to presuppose that there is a single, essential philosophical problem that accounts for all of the problems of the modern world. This kind of monolithic, reductionistic thinking runs throughout the text, and is at best unhelpful for non-specialists attempting to make subtler distinctions. Questions 2 and 3 assume a similarly crude appreciation of both Asian and Western models for empirical study, as if there were only one "Eastern" Asian model for meditation or self-cultivation and only one paradigm for "Western" science. At times this over-simplification appears to establish a straw man, misrepresenting the complexity of both traditions and then comparing them unfairly. The text treats "Eastern meditation" as a monolithic entity, ignoring all the differences between Indian, Chinese, Korean, and Japanese models, to say the least. For example, the translators identify his project in the following way: "In chapter 1...Yuasa's main concern is to explicate, from an historical perspective, the Eastern mind-body theory uniquely inherited in the various Eastern religious-philosophical system such as Yoga, Buddhism, and Daoism." (p.xiii). Despite the reductionism implied by the use of the definite article ("the Eastern mind-body theory"), the translators seem to feel that this is a "bold and provocative task," since that phrase is used three times in two pages to describe Yuasa's work.
Furthermore, on the one hand Yuasa claims that the impoverished terms and techniques of the Western scientific method don't apply to ki models, while on the other hand he attempts to use the results of Western Science to support his claims. The result is useful perhaps in offering us a new terminology, but is a confusing and somewhat ambiguous approach.
Another confusing contradiction that appears in the text is the fact that it claims to be offering a nondualistic approach, but for the most part all of the arguments and examples invoke dualism in order to be explained. For instance, on page xix the translator suggests that in following "Eastern" self-cultivation methods, one "faces ones' surrounding external environment, the world of matter." This distinction between matter and energy, internal and external, doesn't sound very non-dualistic. The translators suggest that "Accordingly, self-cultivation methods have the following philosophical scheme: they presuppose an initial correlative or provisional dualism between mind and body. ... But once the project is completed, it holds the position of inseparable mind-body oneness, which culminates in Buddhism as satori and in Daoism as Dao." (p.xy) Not only is this kind of claim monolithic, but it doesn't seem very accurate. A number of mystical and yogic technologies, for instance, don't involve any kind of mind-body dualism, including Buddhism, for whom the organism is not a mind living in a body, but a namarupa, a "psychophysical" organism. He also conflates the Japanese notion of satori with other Buddhist notions of enlightenment, and, even more troubling, also with the Chinese notion of dao, which is not an awakening but the mode of operation of things or events. Its not clear how dao is supposed to equate with bodhi or "awakening." Elsewhere dao is also conflated with "original human nature"(p.xx). This interpretation represents only a small trend within Japanese Buddhism, and is improperly contextualized when taken to represent all forms of Asian thought.
Another problem with the book is the clarity of the writing. This seems to be more of a problem with the translation than with the content, although at times the distinction becomes difficult to determine. At one point the translator offers to summarize Yuasa's conception of the relationship between ki and mind as follows: "ki is originally a transformation of the activities of the original nature of mind." (p.xxi) This statement is more of a definition, though an obscure one, than it is an explanation. Here we are being offered a new terminology, which can be useful, though an essential ambiguity remains.
Finally, there is a substantial comparative component to this project, and this is where the text is most successful. The author introduces many Western thinkers into the discourse, including Carl Jung, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Henri Bergson, and others. In fact, the field of comparative philosophy of science is woefully undeveloped, and this book makes its greatest contribution to the evolution of this field. Ironically, however, the success of this part of the book undermines his implied claim of an "Eastern/Western" dichotomy. The very fact that he can appeal to Western models as well as Eastern ones to support his interpretations indicates that the ideas he discusses transcend geographic delineations. In what sense are they Eastern if they are also found in the West?
Overall, the book is an only modestly successful example of the attempt to bridge the gap between yogic phenomena and scientific study. These attempts are always hampered by the fact that the two represent entirely different teleologies and purposes. Still, those interested in comparative philosophy of science might find the book a useful addition to their libraries.