In his A Theory of Justice, John Rawls suggests that a society's notion of justice informs its distribution of rights, obligations, and goods. For him, "justice as fairness" ensures that the principles dictating this distribution be agreed upon fairly. I will argue that there is no exact parallel in the Chinese tradition to what Rawls is calling "justice as fairness." Instead, we see serving a similar purpose an emphasis on the regulation of harmonious processes within the body of society. This can be seen in the use of the Chinese word zhi (ÖÎ) to refer both to governing and to healing. In this sense, Chinese ideas about justice seem to come closer to Plato than to Rawls.
Using Rawls's notion of justice as informing the basic structure of society, this paper will explore the idea of "justice as zhi" in Chinese thought, especially in the influential Confucian text known as the Great Learning (Daxue ´óѧ). We will also examine Plato's notion of "justice as order" as developed in the Republic. Major similarities and differences will be articulated. Both Plato's notion of justice as order, and the Chinese notion of justice as zhi, will be seen to address the basic structure of society, and they both differ from Rawls' model in several ways. For instance, Rawls's notion is a contractarian one, which cannot be said of the Confucian or Platonic models. Also, Rawls' notion is deontological, while the notions articulated in the Daxue and the Republic can be described as teleological. On the basis of these comparative investigations, it will ultimately be suggested that Platonic and Chinese models are not as different as one might think, and are certainly more similar to each other than either is to the modern liberal theory of Rawls.
First, we will examine the meaning of "justice," especially as articulated by Rawls. This will serve as our benchmark for our subsequent analysis of the Confucian and Platonic models. Finally, we will compare the two models, and conclude that they share many similar concerns and attitudes.
Some scholars of the Chinese tradition have suggested, for instance, that the traditional Confucian virtue known as yi (Òå) should be translated as "justice." However, it seems facile and somewhat unhelpful to offer simple equivalents to such polyvalent terms as either yi or "justice." One problem is that, in general, all words have their own primary meanings as well as numerous subsidiary meanings, only some of which are represented in a simple correspondence. The overall implications, then, of each term are quite different, and therefore the overtones and subtle shades of meaning are overlooked in such a simplistic approach.
Furthermore, in this particular case, yi refers to a virtue which applies on the individual level, but not necessarily on the social, communal level. Yi as it functions in the Confucian sense is kind of a moral intuition, a sense of right and wrong, which might be described as serving justice, but certainly not as constituting it. As Roger Ames says:
"For the early Confucians, yi is a possibility for moral achievement which ties the natural endowment of individuals to their natural and social environments."
In this sense, yi refers to the ability of individuals to properly contextualize themselves in terms of their social situation. Although one needs to integrate oneself into a community, still the locus of this integration is to be found within the individual.
Finally, since yi must be considered, as Feng Youlan suggests, "regardless of material result," it's value is somewhat abstract, and does not depend on the specific distributions which arise on its basis. Being right, in the sense of yi, is its own reward, at least for Confucius.
Therefore, rather than simply find a Chinese term to translated as "justice," it would probably be better to find one which serves the same function in Chinese thought as the word "justice" does in, for instance, Rawls's thought. By doing so we are acknowledging that no simple translation exists, and that whatever correspondence we do find is more functional than linguistic. The use of Rawls here is justified because, in addition to arguing on behalf of thinking of justice in terms of fairness, he also analyzes the qualities which any notion of justice must demonstrate.
Therefore our first step is to identify exactly what Rawls sees as the purpose of a notion of justice in any political system. Rawls says, "For us the primary subject of justice is the basic structure of society." What this means is that, whatever conception of justice is adopted by a given society, it must:
"…provide a way of assigning rights and duties in the basic institutions of society and [define] the appropriate distribution of the benefits of social cooperation,"
and it must determine criteria for the establishment of laws and punishments to maintain or protect these distributions. That is, it must constitute the guiding principle underlying the structure of society's institutions.
Rawls further notes that:
"an important test of a theory of justice is how well it introduces order and system into our considered judgments over a wide range of questions."
Thus, we are safe in concluding that, at least for Rawls, an orderly society is one goal of any conception of justice. An orderly society is a well-structured society, and this depends on the adoption of a conception of justice which is consistent with the attitudes and beliefs of society's constituents. Rawls says:
"…a society is well-ordered when it is not only designed to advance the good of its members but when it is also effectively regulated by a public conception of justice. …One may think of a public conception of justice as constituting the fundamental charter of a well-ordered human association."
It is worth noting that Rawls' emphasis on social order is consistent with his overall concern with coherence. Randy Peerenboom describes the coherence position, which he also attributes to Rawls, in the following way:
"Coherence theories aim to make one's system or web of beliefs coherent by bringing one's ethical judgments into line with one's intuitions. They are nonfoundational is that no belief is privileged as most basic or fundamental. There are no first principles that serves as the foundation on which to build up an edifice of moral argument, no axiomatic moral truths from which one spins out a moral system through deduction or formal logical argument. …To justify one's position, one simply appeals to other beliefs in the web."
The important thing, then, is that, whatever conception of justice is arrived at in any particular case, it must make sense, it must be consistent with the general body of beliefs and practices present in a community. In this sense, it does not depend on any absolutely valid first principle or principles, but rather that as a whole, it does not contradict or violate its own premises. In this way, it can be said to be reasonable, though some particular conceptions of justice, Rawls will argue, are more reasonable than others.
Finally, Rawls sums up his criteria for a valid theory of justice:
"We should view a theory of justice as a guiding framework designed to focus our moral sensibilities and to put before our intuitive capacities more limited and manageable questions for judgment. The principles of justice identify certain considerations as morally relevant and the priority rules indicate the appropriate precedence when these conflict, while the conception of the original position defines the underlying idea which is to inform our deliberations."
We can identify, then, at least four functions performed by an adequate conception of justice as it is described by Rawls: a) it must help to inform the basic structure of society; b) it must lead to increased social order; c) it's legitimacy must be publicly acknowledged as making sense, so as to limit popular dissatisfaction and discontent (that is to say, there must be at least general agreement concerning the fairness of the basic structure of society); and d) it must help to clarify and prioritize moral considerations.
For our examination of the Chinese notion of justice as zhi, our proof text will be the influential Confucian text known as the Daxue (´óѧ, or "Great Learning"). The text, originally a relatively obscure part of the collection of materials known as the Liji (Àñ¼Ç), gained prestige during the (Neo-)Confucian revival which takes place between around 1000 and 1200 AD. It reached its peak of popularity and influence through the attentions paid to it by the Neo-Confucian genius Zhuxi (Öì ìä pronounced "joo shee": 1130-1200 BCE) and his immediate predecessors, the Cheng brothers (Chenghao ³Ì ò«:1032-1085; and Chengyi ³Ì Òà : 1033-1108). Zhuxi is responsible for grouping it, along with the Analects of Confucius, the Book of Mencius, and the "Zhongyong" (ÖÐÓ¹, or "Doctrine of the Mean," another originally minor text from the Liji), as the four "Confucian Classics," later to become the basis of the Chinese Civil Service examinations. The title of the text, Daxue, can mean "Great Learning" or "Adult Learning"-the phrase in Modern Chinese refers to a university, or education for adults.
The structure of the text, as revealed in its opening passages, revolves around three basic concerns: to make manifest one's exemplary character or moral virtuosity (Ã÷Ã÷µÂ ming ming de); to love the masses of people (Ç×Ãñ qin min); and to abide in the highest good (Ö¹ì¶ÖÁÉÆ zhi yü zhi shan). There are complicated textual issues involving the manuscript, especially since it was rearranged by Zhuxi. However, our concern here is primarily with the first of the three main concerns of the text, namely, the manifestation or radiance of one's bright or exemplary character or moral virtuosity. This is because it is in the interest of accomplishing ming ming de that the text outlines eight steps, and it is in these eight steps that the idea of justice as zhi can be seen.
The eight steps are as follows:
in order to… | one must first… |
1) make manifest one's exemplary character to the whole world
| 2) regulate/heal one's country
|
regulate/heal one's country
| 3) sort out one's family
|
sort out one's family
| 4) develop one's own self
|
develop one's own self
| 5) rectify one's mind
|
rectify one's mind
| 6) make one's intentions sincere
|
make one's intentions sincere
| 7) extend/complete one's knowledge/understanding
|
extend one's knowledge/understanding
| 8) investigate things
|
Because the second of these eight steps concerns the proper ordering of society and the third concerns the proper management of one's household, we may at least tentatively assume that the text is addressed to the ruler or head of the family, those in a position to establish or guarantee social or familial order. Benjamin Schwartz says:
"When the 'Great Learning' [asserts] that anciently 'he who wished to bring order to the state first harmonized his family and wishing to harmonize his family he cultivated his person,' it is presumably speaking of an adult family patriarch."
The eight steps are subsequently reiterated in reverse order, but the end result of this is not, as one might expect, once again ming ming de (making manifest one's exemplary moral character), but rather tianxia ping (ÌìÏÂƽ), the pacification of the whole world.
To narrow our focus even further, we are most closely interested in the use of the term zhi (ÖÎ) to refer to the ordering, governing, or regulating of one's state or society (guo ¹ú ). The term zhi is used in various contexts, including Chinese medical theory. There, it refers to the maintenance or restoration of health through the balancing of yin Òõ and yang Ñô energies within and throughout the various bodily systems. Illness, according to this model, occurs when these energies are obstructed or poorly distributed. As a holistic theory, emphasis is placed on achieving harmony and balance among the organ systems, and this is accomplished in part by consideration of a wide variety of factors affecting physical, mental, and emotional functioning.
Many scholars have already noticed that much of Chinese philosophy operates by micro/macrocosmic analogy. Roger Ames says:
"The 'organismic' metaphysics which explicates the relationship between part and whole and constitutes the common ground on which the Confucian and Taoist traditions have been erected, when fully appreciated, can be extended to virtually all areas of Chinese culture and used as a basis for understanding why the Chinese have traditionally chosen to construe human experience in the way that they do."
Mencius, for instance, argues that we must share a common human nature since we share a basically common physiology, and Chinese medicine, for example, identifies the efficacy of certain roots and herbs by the organs or substances they resemble, as in the case of beets affecting the blood, or ginseng (the root of which resembles a miniature human body) which is regarded as an overall tonic. And Chinese geomancy, or fengshui (·ç Ë® ) essentially applies the principles of Chinese medical meridian therapy to the earth itself, regarding the planet as a living organism with lines of energy running through it.
Thus it seems consistent that processes within the state would be compared to processes within the individual. By considering the state as a macrocosm of the body, proper operation can be seen to depend on the proper distribution and ordering of energies within the state, just as it does within the body. In this sense, harmony or proper order (zhi ÖÎ ) permits of proper contextualization, which can be seen as the function of analogical thinking, at least in the Confucian tradition.
This might be described as a kind of "trickle-down" morality, since the proper example of the ruler is necessary to provide a basis on which the behavior and attitudes of his subordinates can be modeled. Ames says:
"The principles behind the early Confucian interpretation of cosmic activity have correlative principles in their program for the proper administration of the state. The ruler, adhering to the principle of wu-wei [ÎÞ Îª "unobtrusive activity"], emanates morally potent te [µÂ , "virtuosity"] which influences his people and encourages them in the cultivation of their own moral natures. Thus, while seemingly 'doing nothing,' he is able to bring about social harmony."
This is in agreement with Feng Youlan, who says:
"The fact that if the ruler acts as a model, his people will model themselves upon him, means that cultivation of the person becomes the foundation for regulating the home, ruling the state, and bringing peace to the world."
Certainly, the eight steps outlined in the Daxue make this clear, on several levels. The text explicitly associates proper macrocosmic management with proper microcosmic management. That is, it associates bringing peace to the world with proper regulation of the state, which is in turn associated with proper management within the family, proper management of oneself, and so on. A.C. Graham says that the Daxue presents a "classic account of how the social order derives through the family from the self-cultivation of individuals."
Furthermore, proper management within the family is explicitly described as a process of proper distribution, or "sorting out" (Æë qi, pronounced "chee"). Benjamin Schwartz traces this back to ancient Chinese religious thinking:
"…the powerful model of social order which we find in ancestor worship may have profoundly colored the entire 'elite cultural' religious view of both the sociopolitical and cosmic orders. Within the family, the kin members both here and in the world beyond are held together in a network of role relationships ideally governed by a spirit of peace, harmony, and ritual decorum. Here the value of order is central. As a metaphor for the cosmos, it suggests a world of entities and energies held together in familial harmony under the authority of the high god. As a model for the sociopolitical order, it projects the picture of an immanent order based on networks of clearly defined roles and statuses and ideally held together by a system of sacred ritual.
Schwartz also emphasizes that:
"At one point [in the Analects] we find Confucius answering an interlocutor who asks him, 'why are you not serving in government?' as follows: 'What do the Documents say about filial piety? Filial piety-nothing but filial piety and devotion to your brothers-this is being active in government. This is also serving in government.…'"
As indicated in the Analects, the highest virtue according to Confucius is ren (ÈÊ ), sometimes translated as "humaneness" or "benevolence," which is accomplished through zhong (ÖÒ ) and shu (Ë¡ ), usually translated as "conscientiousness" and "altruism." Therefore a man of ren can be described as one who is perfectly socially integrated, who has overcome or balanced the distinction between self and other to the extent that he is motivated by a conscientious concern for the whole, rather than the part. This delicate balance is learned on the microcosmic level, that is, within the family, and this explains Confucius' emphasis on the virtue known as xiao (Т , "filial piety"). Schwartz says:
"…it is in the family that one learns how to exercise authority and how to submit to authority, and it is only the man of jen who can do both."
It can be concluded that, though concerned with overall coherence, the Confucian tradition emphasizes the assimilation of past tradition into the mix of contemporary concerns which must be reconciled with each other. As Randy Peerenboom says:
"…Confucius' politics of harmony seeks not only to bring into reflective equilibrium one's present beliefs, attitudes, goals, and so on, but to render them consistent with previous beliefs, attitudes, and goals. One seeks a coherence that reconciles past with present-hence Confucius' [great] emphasis on tradition."
Confucius is very clear on this point-he consistently characterizes himself, perhaps too modestly, not as an innovator, but merely as a transmitter of tradition. Ames explains it in this way:
"Given the commitment to continuity characteristic of the Chinese tradition, it would be much easier for a philosopher to gain a hearing and win support for a new concept by reinterpreting the existing and popularly accepted vocabulary than it would be for him to advance his own original set of categories. This same commitment to continuity meant that the authority one's ideas might gain by operating within the bounds of an existing tradition would far outweigh concerns for pride in authorship."
Elsewhere, Ames adds:
"In short, Confucius believes that culture-the social refinements developed primarily to encourage and articulate proper moral feelings-is cumulative and generally progressive."
The growth of the tradition, then, proceeds in an organic and diachronically evolutionary way, rather than through the kind of synchronic processes which Rawls describes as "reflective equilibrium."
The Daxue, with its appeal to the ruler or patriarch, does not depend on the contractual agreement between governor and governed. Still, some measure of public satisfaction with the status quo is necessary. This is enforced or guaranteed, according to the traditional accounts (including that of Mencius), by the so-called "mandate of Heaven" (Ìì Ãü tianming), which sanctions the reigning government. Dynastic shifts, according to this model, are explained in term of the transfer of the mandate from one ruler or family to another. Reasons vary for the loss of the mandate-Mencius, for instance, argues that the mandate is secured and maintained through fulfilling the physical and moral needs of the community. Still, he doesn't argue against the idea of an emperor, but merely qualifies and limits the absolute freedom of the emperor to rule in an arbitrary or self-serving fashion. As long as the emperor does not fulfill his obligations to the people, he is not truly an emperor, and can be unseated by another member of the ruling family. So, although the satisfaction of the public is required, their consent is not, and thus this cannot be described as a contractual model.
This differs from Rawls's notion, which is basically a social contract theory. What this means is that the parties involved must, at least implicitly, originally agree to the principles by which they are to be governed. As in classical social contract theory, Rawls begins from a hypothetical starting point. He says that in his theory, "the original position of equality corresponds to the state of nature in the traditional theory of the social contract." This original position, he says, is one in which:
"…no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does anyone know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like."
This guarantees that the agreement on principles of justice, and therefore on the basic structure of society, is made in the absence of personal private interests. The original position of equality ensures that "the principles of justice are the result of a fair agreement or bargain."
Finally, this model can be described as teleological, or goal-directed, since each of the eight steps is defined and justified in terms of what one wants to accomplish: "if one wants to make manifest one's exemplary character to the whole world, one must first regulate/heal one's country;" and so on. That is, the reason why one does any of these steps is in order to accomplish some specific goal, and the culmination of all this is the pacification of the world. This conception of the ultimate good seems to justify describing all of the other steps as "right."
As a contractarian theory, Rawls's model of justice as fairness is not teleological. That is, the concept of "right" is not dependent on its accomplishment of any particular goal. It is more properly based on certain principles and applied consistently, even in cases where it is to our or anyone else's particular detriment. Rawls emphasizes that it is a "deontological" theory, in that it "either does not specify the good independently from the right, or does not interpret the right as maximizing the good."
At this point, it can be further concluded that zhi¸ though not a literal translation of the word "justice," does in fact fit the four characteristics we earlier identified as crucial to a viable notion of justice as Rawls conceives it. First, it does in fact speak to the basic structure of society, in that it provides parallels between the orderly state, the orderly family, and the exemplary individual; and these parallels work in both directions.
Second, it leads to increased social order, which is clearly prioritized both in terms of regulating the state (ÖÎ Æä ¹ú zhi qi guo) and in terms of pacifying the whole world (Ìì Ï ƽ tianxia ping).
Third, in a society properly managed according to this model, the analogical, micro/macrocosmic parallels will be obvious enough to everyone to ensure proper observance of the roles expected of each individual. That is because of the emphasis on "filial piety" (Т xiao), which ensures proper respect for family obligations and consistent conformity to traditional familial patterns.
Finally, it clarifies and prioritizes moral considerations by emphasizing the importance of traditional virtues while still seeing the value of bringing those traditional values into coordination with contemporary and other contextual circumstances. Thus zhi serves a function in the Daxue similar to the notion of "fairness" in Rawls' theory of justice.
Most translations and treatments of Plato's Republic assume that, among other issues raised in the text, one of the most important is the idea of justice, as found on the individual and the social levels. Plato seems to agree with Rawls that justice speaks to the basic structure of society. Julia Annas says:
"Plato believes that once we get clear on the nature of justice, we will see that for a society to be just it must be drastically reorganized in every department, not only in its enforcement of the laws. Injustice cannot be corrected by merely righting a few past wrongs; the whole distribution of wealth, honours, and goods within society must be made to conform to fundamental moral requirements."
Except for the "fundamental" nature of the moral requirements, Plato is in agreement with Rawls that a society's notion of justice must constitute and inform the basic structure of the society, which involves the distribution of social obligations and benefits.
There is, however, some disagreement over whether or not "justice" is the best word for Plato's concern. The Greek term which is often translated as "justice" is dikaiosune which Aristotle contrasts with pleonexia. Rawls defines pleonexia as:
"gaining some advantage for oneself by seizing what belongs to another…or by denying a person that which is due him."
In this sense, dikaiosune refers to the absence of exploitation and the proper distribution of society's benefits.
But Julia Annas, for instance, emphasizes that Plato's conception of dikaiosune does not exactly correspond to Rawls' notion of justice. First of all, dikaiosune can refer to right conduct in general, and in that sense perhaps comes closer to what we are in a position to identify as the Confucian notion of yi. Annas says:
"Plato appears to support this idea [that he is referring to 'right conduct in generally'] when he makes Socrates at 352d describe the search for justice as a search 'for the right way to live.' Hence it is often suggested that dikaiosune should be translated as 'righteousness' or the like, and that it corresponds more closely to 'morality' than to 'justice.'
It is important to note that many translators render yi as righteousness, as in knowing the difference between right and wrong, and there are, as just demonstrated, more substantial parallels between the two virtues as well. So to a certain extent, the same problems arise in translating dikaiosune as "justice" as we found in translating yi as "justice."
Specifically, Plato's conception of dikaiosune differs from Rawls' theory of justice as fairness in several ways. First of all, Plato is not especially concerned with the question of "rights," which is a crucial concern for Rawls.
Secondly, Plato's model is also not contractrarian in the sense that agreement need not be reached between government and governed, although he emphasizes that this is only the case because the "enlightened" Philosophers will be running the state. This guarantees that someone who actually knows what is Good will be looking after everyone's best interests.
Also, Plato's model might be described as teleological, since all of the forms, including justice, are subordinated to, and in some sense defined in terms of, the form of Good. This is because, as Plato says, in becoming aware of the various forms which constitute the epitome of his ontological scheme:
"…in the region of the known the last thing to be seen and hardly seen is the idea of good, and that when seen it must needs point us to the conclusion that this is indeed the cause for all things of all that is right and beautiful, giving birth in the visible world to light, and the author of light and itself in the intelligible world being the authentic source of truth and reason, and that anyone who is to act wisely in private or public must have caught sight of this."
In fact, in his famous cave analogy, the form of Good is represented by the sun, which is that by means of which all other things are seen, and is described as the "brightest region of being." Plato also says:
"For you have often heard that the greatest thing to learn is the idea of good by reference to which just things and all the rest become useful and beneficial…no possession either is of any avail without the possession of the good."
and this is because:
"…is it not apparent that while in the case of the just and the honorable many would prefer the semblance without the reality in action, possession, and opinion, yet when it comes to the good nobody is content with the possession of the appearance but all men seek the reality…"
So, using Rawls' own criteria, Plato's conception of justice is reasonably described as teleological, or goal-directed, since, as Rawls says:
"…the good is defined independently from the right, and then the right is defined as that which maximizes the good."
Plato's model argues analogically, as does the Chinese tradition. He emphasizes the micro/macrocosmic relationship between justice on the individual level and on the societal level. In fact, his purpose in looking for justice within society is that he hopes to locate it within the individual. In doing so, he analyzes both the soul and the state into three parts, and suggests that justice involves maintaining the proper balance between those three parts. Each part of the whole needs to "do its job" and not interfere with the work of any of the others. If the three parts of the soul are harmonized in this fashion, with reason in charge, the individual can be described as "just." If the three parts of the state, which are the three social classes, are properly in balance, with the Guardians/Philosophers in charge, the state can be described as "just." In fact one important function of the educational process in this system is to facilitate the process of assigning individuals to their proper station, relative to their talents.
Plato' use of analogy on the micro and macrocosmic levels in this sense is one way in which he comes closer to Chinese than Rawls does in their thinking about justice. Both the Republic and the Daxue reflect the view that "as above, so below." That is, the person and the state are seen to operate according to similar principles and dynamics.
Also, both the Republic and the Daxue are concerned with an orderly society. Plato's suggestion for a society where everybody stays in their place emphasizes the importance of social stability. However, as Benjamin Schwartz warns:
"…one must be extremely cautious about certain Western notions triggered by terms such as 'order' or 'structure.' 'Order' immediately suggests 'rationality' and rationality immediately suggests a reductionistic rationalism which drives gods and spirits out of nature and deals only with abstract 'entities of reason.' What I am suggesting here, however, is a holistic englobing conception of order which embraces and incorporates every aspect of human experience-including numinous and magical aspects-rather than excluding or eliminating them on the basis of modern Western reductionist criteria of rationalism. The conception of order which seems to emerge in ancient China can embrace, subsume, and even preserve spirits, gods, and all sorts of 'supernatural' (in our sense) phenomena even while reducing their mythic potential.."
It is in this sense that Plato's conception of justice and the Chinese idea of zhi have their closest point of contact. Both the Republic and the Daxue emphasize the importance of sorting things out on all kinds of levels, each of which serves as a standard for and is in turn inspired by the other.
There are, of course, major differences between the Republic and the Daxue, as well as between Greek and Chinese thought in general. For instance, in contrast to the Confucian emphasis on the family as the primary instrument of the modelling which promotes proper ordering of society on all its levels, Plato advocates taking the children out of the home environment, in order to remove them from the personal and private concerns which are part of family life. The claim of parallels between the texts and traditions applies only to the thoughts and ideas covered here, and only because their use in this fashion illuminates some important aspects of each of them.
So it can be seen that both the ideas of justice as "zhi" in the Confucian sense and as "order" in the Platonic sense fit the criteria that Rawls requires any viable theory of justice to meet. They concern the basic structure of society, contribute to social order, can be analogically justified by reference to the microcosm of the person, and they help to clarify and prioritize moral considerations. They differ from Rawls' s model, though, in at least the three ways I have identified-they are more concerned with diachronic coherence than is Rawls, placing a great deal of emphasis on tradition in sorting out and modelling institutions and actions; they not contractarian, as is Rawls's notion; and they is teleological while Rawls's theory is deontological. Finally, it becomes clear that the Republic and the Daxue are actually very close each other in terms of their thinking about justice. Given that Plato's writings have fundamentally influenced the course of Western Philosophy, perhaps the distance between "East" and "West" is not, then, as vast as many are prone to imagine.