No End in Sight: Dewey and Heidegger on Science and Technology

 

By Brian Rochel, Hamline University

 

 

This essay will explore the respective theories of the nature of science and technology between John Dewey and Martin Heidegger. Both Dewey and Heidegger draw heavily on the pre-Socratic notion of science while purporting their respective theoretical foundations. Each theorist provides an account of Ancient Greek philosophy in order to contrast it with contemporary scientific theory, and to describe whence modern theory had borne. While both philosophers offer compelling historical accounts of Greek thought, I will demonstrate how Heidegger offers a more compelling interpretation of Greek natural and scientific philosophy. Furthermore, I will demonstrate how Martin Heidegger’s interpretation of Ancient teleology accounts for the shortcomings of modern science. Finally, it will be clear that Heidegger offers a compelling argument against the foundation upon which modern science has set, and which Dewey philosophically endorses.

 

I. Dewey and Science

 

First, like Heidegger, Dewey is a non-foundationalist. There can be no true foundations, claims Dewey, because they will be either entirely abstract, or they will change as human experience changes and are therefore not “foundational.” So for Dewey true knowledge is not separate from experience but is instead involved in the process (Dewey 87). His empiricism is in contrast to that of Locke or Hume in that Dewey rejects any realm of ideas or universal truth. What’s more, Dewey is a pragmatic theorist. As such, his concern is with theories that are readily useful or applicable rather than foundational or metaphysical. Moreover, his account of the nature of science begins by focusing on a static/dynamic dichotomy which he purports. Dewey believes that change is absolute and necessary, that any conception of a static universe is absolutely without justification. He characterizes the natural universe as “so multiplex and far-reaching that it cannot be summed up and grasped in any one formula. And [that] change [is] a measure of “reality” or energy of being; change is omnipresent” (Dewey 61). This notion of nature as ever changing and “omnipresent,” argues Dewey, is quite the contrary of scientific philosophy until the coming of modern science. The world of Ancient Greece was one of a fixed and changeless nature, defined by limited forms and where rest was regarded as the epitome of perfection (Dewey 54-59).

          In order to reproduce that concept most clearly, Dewey maintains a comparison between the Ancient Greek and contemporary notions of essence and reality throughout his account of science and technology. As Dewey eloquently states, “I see no way in which the truly philosophic import of the picture of the world painted by modern science can be appreciated except to exhibit it in contrast with that earlier picture which gave classic metaphysics its intellectual foundation and confirmation” (Dewey 54). He offers a fairly complete account of Ancient Greek science, which I will provide in pertinent part here. It is worth noting, however, that Reconstruction in Philosophy (the only Dewey text which I am citing) was derived from lectures Dewey gave to a non-Western audience, so his account of Ancient philosophy in this case may very well be less than comprehensive—though certainly representative of his complex interpretation.

As Dewey construes the Ancient world, not only was the universe fixed and ordered, but it was ordered as such. Not only did natural phenomena have a fixed place, they had a place that was fixed in relation to everything else. In fact, “the universe is constituted on an aristocratic, one can truly say feudal, plan” (Dewey 59). He asserts that the natural world was conceived in—and is a product of—the direct relation to the then-existing social construction (Dewey 63). “Classic thought accepted a feudally arranged order of classes or kinds, each “holding” from a superior and in turn giving the rule of conduct and service to an inferior” (Dewey 61).

Furthermore, John Dewey depicts a great deal of deviation from Ancient Greek thought in his account of modern science. First is the movement from a world of rest to a world of constant change. He characterizes an advance from the Ancient belief that potentiality implies following through a fixed course, to the modern idea of potentiality implying novel change or radical deviation (Dewey 58). Also, Dewey asserts the movement from a scientific “hierarchy of Being” has advanced science in some way (59). Next, a more appropriate definition of “change” has also been instituted: rather than “change” as a form of independent being, “change” is now a “formula of description and calculation of interdependent changes” (Dewey 61).

However, the most significant change from Ancient to modern natural science, and the one that allows for “infinite human progress,” is the annihilation of final causes. There can be no final cause—no “end”—asserts Dewey, for that would necessarily be foundational. Indeed there is no “end” to nature, as there is no “end” to any natural phenomenon. Dewey proclaims that this deconstruction of ends in nature “is the reason why the intellectual modification of the last few centuries may truly be called a revolution” (Dewey 60). He is, of course, talking about the Cartesian/Baconian conception of science as an object for “rational man” to conquer. Indeed, “All of the scientific reformers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries strikingly agree in regarding the doctrine of final causes as the cause of the failure of science” (Dewey 68). This very revolution brought about the ability of humans to control nature for their own “scientific and practical purposes.” Nature is to be used for “this end or that.” There is no end to nature, no essence; rather, nature is a means to the end of human progress—whatever form that may take at a given time (Dewey 67-70). “Nature is subdued to human purpose because it is no longer the slave of metaphysical and theological purpose” (Dewey 71).

 

II. Heidegger and Science

 

In Martin Heidegger’s we see a theory of science and technology much different from that of John Dewey. His philosophy, while non-foundational, is built heavily on notions of existentialism, ontology and essence. What’s more, the very basis for the differentiation in scientific theory between Heidegger and Dewey is likely the significantly different interpretation of Ancient Greek philosophy between the two. In order to demonstrate this incongruity, I will provide Heidegger’s theory of technology in sum, focusing primarily on its relation to his account of Ancient scientific theory.

One of the primary arguments Heidegger employs is that modern science is a concealment of the truth1, insofar as it completely disregards Dasein, that is, the relationship of human to the natural world. Modern science treats nature as a means to an end by rejecting the truth that nature is not “ours” with which to do whatever “we” please. In fact, Heidegger argues that our concept of nature should be quite the opposite. For, he explains, humans do not—can not—exist without the world in which they are projected. Moreover, Heidegger challenges his readers to think of technology in terms of its Ancient etymological roots, that is, in terms of technē. “Technē is the name…for the arts of the mind and the fine arts. Technē belongs to bringing-forth, to poiēsis; it is something poetic” (Heidegger 318). Technology is that which is created and used by human hands. It is indicative of the primordial relationship between human and nature. Technology is essentially a mode of revealing. In discussing Aristotle’s use of the term he writes that “[Technē] reveals whatever does not bring itself forth and does not yet lie here before us, whatever can look and turn out now one way and now another” (Heidegger 319).

What’s more, there exists a massive danger in allowing technology to be the concept that modern science has thus far forced upon it. Heidegger introduces the notion of a “standing-reserve” in order to illustrate this danger. As he defines, “Whatever stands by in the sense of standing-reserve no longer stands over against us as object” (Heidegger 322). He means that whatever is ordered about merely to be ordered about some more; whatever lacks an essence, and is merely a means to an end, is a standing-reserve. In this way modern science views nature as a standing-reserve; or, as Dewey puts it, a means to the end of human progress. Take, for example, a man-made dam on a river. The dam exists simply to control nature; it turns the river from an end in itself—to be a river—into a standing-reserve which now exists to allow humans to have more or less water in a given designated area. The dam interrupts the essence of the river by, for example, changing the entire flow of the river, greatly altering its natural process of soil erosion, and essentially engaging in its metaphysical alteration. The technology—the dam—fails to take into account that nature, like man, exists2 (see Heidegger 172-73, 320-22).

As if this subordination of nature to the role of standing-reserve is not perilous enough, Heidegger claims that allowing technology to run the course upon which it has been set will inevitably lead to humans themselves becoming standing-reserves (Heidegger 332). This peril has already become reality, as evidenced by the primary role of slavery in the American Industrial Revolution. Modern technology knows no bounds in its ability to subordinate ends to means. “As a destining, it banishes man into the kind of revealing that is an ordering” (Heidegger 320).

Finally, it is apparent that Heidegger seems to adopt a sort teleology, not foundational, and not quite the working out of internal logic; rather, one that concerns Being, truth and essence. It is a concept of final casualty that plays a significant role in Heidegger’s natural theory. The essence this theory adopts, though, is really an empty essence, an essence that is purely formal. For Heidegger, existence precedes essence, but the essence of truth is unconcealment of Being. Being presents itself—unconceals itself—through the only worldly thing capable of consciousness and negativity—through human (the human condition). Heidegger’s teleology demands that the essence of a given thing be taken into serious consideration. Thus, we must consider the essence of technology as it is both concealed and unconcealed. The essence of modern technology, then, is seeing the world as a means to an end. Modern technology requires that humans see the world as a means, as a standing-reserve (Heidegger 326-8). Therefore, modern technology has concealed the truth of Dasein, the truth that humans are in fact defined by their primordial relationship with the earth.

 

III. Discussion of Ancient Greek Theory

 

It is now clear that John Dewey and Martin Heidegger offer contrasting views on the philosophy and nature of science and technology, and their relationship to the natural world. Dewey establishes the view that nature is a means to the end of human progress, while Heidegger asserts that Being demands a relationship between human and nature such that nature is essential, and that the end of nature is to be nature. Anything more conceals the essence of nature and reduces it to a standing-reserve. We shall now carefully consider each philosopher’s interpretation of Ancient Greek philosophy in order to provide a basis for understanding why Heidegger provides a more sound argument than does Dewey.

To begin, Dewey states that “just because [the Greek] theory of knowing was dominated by esthetic considerations, the finite was the perfect” (Dewey 66). While Heidegger may or may not endorse aesthetic consideration in an essential picture of nature, he would question the claim that Ancient Greek philosophy can be easily reduced to “obsession” with the “finite.” And the German theorist would be justified in any such critique. To explicate, I shall provide several fragments from Ancient Greek philosopher Heraclitus which, when read in a traditional pre-Socratic context, support this idea: “what is opposed brings together,” “fire is want and satiety,” “This kosmos [the same for all] no god nor man has made, but it always was and is and will be: an everliving fire, kindling in measures and in measures going out,” and the ultimate Heideggerian endorsement, “nature loves to hide”—not to mention his explicit conviction that the world is in constant “change” and “strife” (Cohen 25-34). But the critique extends beyond the pre-Socratic notion to, for example, the Aristotelian. If Dewey is in fact supposing all Ancient thought as necessarily endorsing a fixed, limited universe always seeking rest, that endorsement would be dubious when applied to Aristotelian science as well.

Of central importance, however, is each theorist’s respective account of teleology, of which Heidegger’s seems much more akin to the world of Ancient Greece. Dewey’s account of the term, I argue, falls within Heidegger’s account of the failure of Western philosophy to make sense of it: “That which gives bounds, that which completes, [is] telos, which is all too often translated as “aim” and “purpose,” and so misinterpreted. The telos is responsible for what as matter and what as aspect are together…” (Heidegger 315). These bounds represent not the limits that force the thing to stop, rather the essence of the thing: what it will be upon production and what it is once produced. An object is thus not limited because it could not be anything more than it is. This is hardly an act of limitation on the natural world, but is rather a matter of understanding the world as already limited, already essential, already an end.

This telos can be represented in terms of formal or material limitation. As I alluded to above, an omission of telos, or of these limits, can lead to nature or man becoming a standing-reserve. The formal limits of the river are disregarded when the dam interrupts the telos of the river, reducing it to standing-reserve. A coal mine serves as an example of the disregard modern science evinces with respect to material limitation. A coal mine is reduced to a standing-reserve by virtue of its existence. Humans extract as much high-yield carbon substances as possible without regard for limitation. Yet, modern technology abuses the limits of coal everyday. Mass combustion of coal has resulted in a potentially dangerous situation for the natural world3. Not to mention the infinity that modern science demands of the very finite amount of coal mines. But nobody has “imposed” material limits on how much coal can be extracted from a given mine and combusted. In fact, those limits are in the nature, the telos, of the coal itself. Coal is essentially prehistoric fossils which support geographically elevated land masses—not some infinite source for consumption.

Therefore limits were never imposed by the Greeks, but rather recognized. This is exactly what Heidegger means when he speaks of the essence of Being and of truth. Coming to be (in any manifestation) is the coming to be of truth, of Being. And Being necessitates that something come to be within its telos, within the very limits which define its essence. Allowing technology to be limitless, formless and essential-less disregards the primordial relationship between human and nature akin to the Greek notion of telos—it conceals the truth of Being.

On the contrary, Dewey explicitly attacks this endorsement of a natural telos. “[Ends] paralyze constructive human inventions by a theory which condemns them in advance to failure” (Dewey 70). But this statement begs the question, what is “failure?” If natural ends limit human behavior, it is worth asking what those “limits” represent. For Heidegger and the Ancient Greeks, these limits are an understanding of Being. That is, of the natural world which begets truth.

Platonic theory4, however, may support Dewey’s conception of science and of nature, which very well could have led to Dewey’s apparent failure to adequately address Ancient Greek philosophy with any comprehensive amount of diversity. In fact, one of the primary rudiments of the difference between Heidegger’s and Dewey’s conception of Ancient Greek philosophy is Heidegger’s commitment to not reducing the theories of many Ancients into one “Ancient Greek philosophy.” Heidegger even draws on many differences amongst the Ancient theorists in order to better explicate his own arguments. To illustrate, Heidegger differentiates between Heraclitus, Parmenides, Aristotle and Plato (among others) many times throughout The Origin of the Work of Art, Letter on Humanism and The Question Concerning Technology.

It is Platonic theory, however, that has dominated much of the Western interpretation of Ancient Greek thought, primarily by virtue of its indoctrination into Cartesian philosophy and Christianity. In fact Descartes may have even been the segue between Ancient idealism and Dewey’s modern progressive science. Cartesian philosophy promised two things to the scientific world: 1) “A promised goal of becoming ‘masters and possessors of nature’;” and 2) an “Archimedean point5” upon which all knowledge can be built (Lloyd 48). These are the foundations which Platonism had sought, and to which modern science lays claim.

In terms of Dewey’s philosophy, then, it is possible to consider the working out of the internal logic of Platonic/Cartesian dualism as an exact separation and subsequent subordination of nature to human. But while this may account for Dewey’s logic of progress and his foundation for the prominence of modern science and technology, it appears that it has, as a paradigm of scientific theory, run its course. In being a scientific project, modern science has failed at what it set out to do. “When and insofar as a science passes beyond correctness and goes on to a truth, which means that it arrives at the essential disclosure of beings as such, it is philosophy” (Heidegger 187).

This is what is happening in modern science, in the Platonic/Cartesian science about which Dewey philosophizes. And its end, as seen in the philosophy of Einstein, is evident. In fact, Einstein’s theory exemplifies eloquently the argument upon which Heidegger contemplates this idea. The line of reason purported by Descartes and developed throughout modernity is a line of reason that fails to take into adequate consideration the essential elements of Ancient Greek philosophy. As such, modern science fails to take into account the primordial throwness of humanity, the essence of Being, of Dasein—thus, it fails to take into account the actual relationship between human and world.

 

IV. Conclusion

 

          In conclusion, John Dewey and Martin Heidegger offer contrasting takes on the nature of Ancient Greek philosophy. These theories underlie the distinction between each respective analysis of the nature of science and technology, both Ancient and modern. While Dewey likely consolidated a rich theory of Ancient Greek philosophy of science and nature for his audience, he presents the idea that all of the Ancients can be classified together. On the contrary, Heidegger draws his rich and complex theory of technology from a highly diverse appreciation of the Ancients. Based on the notion that each theory is predicated upon Ancient philosophy then, Heidegger’s deep interpretation is more appealing. Moreover, Heidegger’s account of teleology clearly illustrates where each philosophy differs the most, as well as where modern science has failed to recognize the limits of Being and nature. Finally, Heidegger offers a compelling argument that modern science has reached its “scientific” end, and yet has failed at seeking “truth.”◦

© Brian Rochel, 2006

 

 

 

 

 

References

 

 

Cohen, Mark; Curd, Patricia; and Reeve, C.D.C. Readings in Ancient Greek Philosophy:

From Thales to Aristotle, Second Ed. (Indianapolis/Cambridge, Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2000).

 

De Oliveira, Nythamar. "The Worldhood of the Kosmos in Heidegger's Reading of Heraclitus." 1996. 19 Nov. 2005 <http://www.geocities.com/nythamar/herakleitos.html>.

 

Dewey, John. Reconstruction in Philosophy. Beacon Press. Boston, MA. 1957.

 

Heidegger, Martin. Basic Writings. San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1992.

 

Lloyd, Genevieve. The Man of Reason: Male and Female in Western Philosophy. 1984.

 

 

Notes