The Unity of Consciousness in Real People

The Unity of Consciousness in Real People

By Eric Grossman, The University of Pennsylvania

The purpose of the following essay is to critically examine the role of “unity of consciousness” in the philosophy of Kathleen Wilkes as presented in Real People: Personal Identity without Thought Experiments. Though traditionally considered a necessary condition for personhood, Wilkes challenges common conceptions of identity by arguing that personhood is often maintained despite significant examples which ostensibly show a disunity of consciousness. My analysis of this topic will consist of four distinct sections: First, I shall briefly explain the six conditions of personhood cited by Wilkes which are crucial to understanding her later arguments. Next, I will provide an account of the unity of consciousness according to Wilkes and make several important distinctions necessary to understanding her theory. In the course of this discussion I shall consider some examples of common disunity presented by Wilkes which help clarify her argument and additionally compare her notion of the unity of consciousness to that of Franz Brentano. After this, I will examine specific cases of fugue states, hypnosis and multiple personality disorder which Wilkes presents as evidence that personhood can survive apparent disunities of consciousness. Finally, I will assess the plausibility of Wilkes’s conclusions both within the context of her own philosophy and against the backdrop of Brentano’s theory of personal identity. Ultimately, I will show that, though the end conclusions reached by Wilkes are largely correct, Brentano’s theory of personal identity is not only stronger than that of Wilkes, but also withstands many of the challenges which cripple Wilkes’s conclusions.

Concerning the Six Conditions of Personhood

Before examining Wilkes’s account of the unity of consciousness, it is first necessary to briefly list and explain the six conditions for personhood cited in Real People. These six conditions are intended to provide a general outline of what, all other things held equal, qualifies a human being as a person. The first of condition is the “rationality” condition which states that a person must typically act in a rational way. Though it is nearly impossible to conceive of a perfectly rational human being, the rationality condition demands only that a person think and act in accordance with the rules of logic. This includes theoretical reasoning (being able to reliably move from beliefs that are assumed to be true to conclusions that are probably true) as well as practical reasoning (acting in such a way that will most likely satisfy one’s goals). The second condition states that persons are “subjects of intentional ascriptions.” In other words, a person explains their behavior by invoking intentional states. Let us consider an example to illustrate this point: If someone is seen to be waving their arms behind a departing bus, it can be assumed that that person desires to be on the bus. Here, we attribute a propositional attitude to that person of which there is an object of a specific desire (in this case, the object is to be onboard the bus). Third, Wilkes holds that a person is a moral object which demands specific attitudes be taken toward them. This condition simply implies that persons deserve a specific kind of treatment and that there are certain inherent obligations between person (i.e. not to cause them unnecessary pain, etc.). The third condition necessitates a fourth which states that persons are “moral agents” that can be expected to reciprocate the treatment afforded to them by the third condition. The fifth condition requires that the ability to use language is necessary to be a person. And finally, the sixth condition demands that people have a special kind of consciousness and the ability to form “second order states” (i.e. beliefs and opinions/desires relating to those beliefs). This condition implies that personhood requires some awareness of oneself as distinct from the rest of the world which essentially means that a person is self-conscious.1

Wilkes vs. Brentano: Differing Accounts of the Unity of Consciousness

Having identified the six conditions for personhood, it is now possible to give an account of the unity of consciousness according to Wilkes. For Wilkes, unity of consciousness means nothing more than not having beliefs with contradictory contents. Here, we must make the distinction between “absence of unity” and “positive disunity” (italics omitted).2 Absence of unity can be observed in an agent that divides their attention between two unrelated things simultaneously whereas positive disunity is illustrated by an agent “torn between wants and desires that are incompatible,” or alternatively, positive disunity can be identified in a case of self-deception in which an agent holds beliefs that are inconsistent with one another.3 With respect to this last example, Wilkes notes that one might argue that there is no disunity of consciousness at all given that typically the self-deceived is not conscious of any conflict (i.e. one belief is conscious, while the other is unconscious). However, as Wilkes observes, we have such an enormous multitude of unquestioned, unconscious beliefs (that touching an object will not make it disappear, for example) that if we actually did critically examine such beliefs, there would most likely be many “hidden” inconsistencies.4 In fact, it is only after deliberately trying to reveal these beliefs that we become consciously aware that we hold them. Thus, for Wilkes the mere potential of a belief to enter into our conscious awareness is sufficient to qualify it as a belief capable of contradicting other beliefs. Assuming the validity of this premise, insofar as disunity of consciousness is nothing more than having beliefs with contradictory contents, we cannot reject the fact that disunity of consciousness is actually a very common phenomenon. Nevertheless, we would not deny that the aforementioned minor inconsistencies in conscious or unconscious beliefs are sufficient to deny personhood. If we accept Wilkes’s conclusion that these examples do illustrate a disunity of consciousness, we must also accept that personhood can survive such disunity.

In contrast to the account of unity of consciousness presented by Wilkes, Franz Brentano holds that unity of consciousness is maintained despite the multiplicity of our consciousness at any one time: “Our consciousness does not present itself to our inner perception as something simple, but it shows itself as being composed of many parts.” states Brentano.5 Brentano notes that, “Even if one real thing cannot be a multiplicity of real things, it can nevertheless contain a multiplicity of parts.” Applying this principle to consciousness, though “we can be conscious of the same primary object in different ways. . .[or] our mental activity can be directed toward more than one primary object,” these activities are unified by one’s consciousness thus rendering the person having the multitude of perceptions or engaging in simultaneous activities one subject of experience.6 Brentano argues that the relationship between different parts of our conscious states demands this conclusion. To illustrate this point, Brentano considers the act of seeing something while simultaneously also hearing a noise. As he observes, both acts must belong to the “same real unity” because “we do compare colors which we see with sounds which we hear.”7 Though wholly separate phenomena, the interrelationship between what we see and what we hear and our ability to relate the two proves that they are part of one unified whole. Here, Brentano drastically disagrees with Wilkes. As shown above, Wilkes characterizes this circumstance as a fundamental disunity of consciousness, whereas Brentano argues that each object of our conscious attention is merely one part of a “collective” in much the same way that a house is one part of a city (italics omitted).8 Though Wilkes and Brentano agree that we can be consciously aware of multiple things simultaneously, the former holds that this implies a fundamental disunity of consciousness whereas the latter argues that the act of seeing and the act of hearing are merely two parts of one thing—namely, consciousness.

Fugue States, Hypnosis, Multiple Personality Disorders and the Unity of Consciousness

Though Wilkes presents the previously mentioned examples of disunity as a means to show that disunity of consciousness is a common phenomenon, she also provides several extreme examples of fugue states, hypnosis and multiple personality disorders in order to support her claim that personhood can be maintained despite serious and prolonged disunities of consciousness. The first of these cases involves a fugue experienced by Reverend Ansel Bourne who, in 1887, supposedly, and suddenly, abandoned his life as a preacher in Rhode Island and traveled to Pennsylvania where he managed a small shop he had opened. For two months Bourne managed this shop apparently unaware of his previous life as a clergyman only to awake one day in a bedroom which he had never seen, once again believing that he was a clergyman, and with no recollection of the previous two months.9 In her analysis, Wilkes argues that though this case is an example of radical diachronic disunity—a failure of unity across time—Bourne nonetheless retains his identity throughout the ordeal.

Wilkes supports this conclusion despite the fact that Bourne’s factual memory failed him completely, his behavioral patterns were radically altered, his psychological traits were completely different and his self-conception was wholly changed for a prolonged period of time. As Wilkes notes, Bourne did not have to relearn the English language and it seems that he must have had no difficulty remembering other pieces of practical knowledge such as handling money and change. In fact, Bourne’s consciousness remained synchronically unified—that is, unified in each individual moment—as prior to and during the two month period, in any given moment, his consciousness was no more dis-unified than a normal person’s. Additionally, Bourne’s physical body remained constant throughout further supporting the conclusion that he retained his identity. Appealing to intuitive inclinations, Wilkes concludes that short- and long-term fugue states do not pose a problem for re-identification as we are not tempted to conclude that Bourne became a different person for a short two month period and then once again became his original self. In fact, accepting this conclusion would wholly violate the rules of logic as nothing, including people, can have two beginnings. If we agree with Wilkes that Bourne remained the same person when he returned to his original self after the fugue was over, we cannot claim that he was a wholly different person for two months only to wake up again as himself. Thus, insofar as we accept the validity of Wilkes’s premises, we must also accept that unity of consciousness is not a necessary condition for personhood.

In her discussion of hypnosis Wilkes provides several examples (of which two will be considered here) that she believes further justifies her conclusion that disunity of consciousness is not necessary for personhood. The first example describes a patient who, while under hypnosis, is instructed not to see a chair in the room. Although when asked if they see the chair the patient replies negatively, when told to walk a path in which the chair is an obstacle, the patient avoids the chair. Furthermore, when asked why they avoided the chair, the patient conjures up an excuse of which the chair is no part. In her second example, Wilkes describes a hypnotized patient who is told not to feel pain. The subject’s hand is then placed in exceedingly cold water. In similar fashion to the chair experiment, when asked if any pain is felt, the subject replies negatively. However, if given a writing instrument and a piece of paper, the subject will use their other hand to complain about the pain in writing. Wilkes claims that this is an example of a “hidden observer” which, in contrast to the patient’s verbal indications, recognizes the pain.10

Much like the fugue state, the breakdown in diachronic unity of hypnotized patients is due to changed behavioral patterns, failure to remember what occurred while under hypnosis, etc. However, there is a breakdown in synchronic unity as well. Synchronically, the hypnotized subject’s verbal reports conflict with their non-verbal behavior. This inconsistency can be observed in the case of the chair experiment in which the subject denies seeing the chair (verbal) but still avoids it (behavioral). Even more markedly, in the “hidden observer” case, an entirely new consciousness seems to appear which, through writing, overtly contradicts the subject’s verbal reports. Again, Wilkes observes that in hypnosis cases the subject’s body remains constant and again she argues that despite failures of both diachronic and synchronic unity, our intuitions lead us to claim that the hypnotized subject remains the same person before, during and after hypnosis.

Though Wilkes provides several documented cases of multiple personality disorder to support her argument, she delves into the most detail in the case of Christine Beauchamp. In 1893, Ms. Beauchamp was working as a hospital nurse when, on a stormy night, she had a succession of three shocks each of which was serious enough alone to damage her nervous system. Subsequent to this occurrence, Ms. Beauchamp developed extreme mental abnormalities. She sought psychiatric help from Dr. Morton Prince who over the course of the next ten years, through both uninduced changes in personality and the use of hypnosis, identified seven unique personalities of Ms. Beauchamp of which one had the name Sally, and the rest were labeled B1-B4. Several of these personalities were aware of some of the thoughts and actions of the others, some were aware of just the thoughts or just the actions of one other. Though Wilkes admits that the conclusions which can be drawn from this case are inconclusive, on the whole, it seems that she argues a plurality of persons exist within the mind of Ms. Beauchamp.11

As in previous cases, Wilkes appeals to the bodily theory of identity in support of the claim that there is just one person.12 However, returning once again to the six conditions of personhood outlined in the first section, Wilkes engages in a critical analysis of Ms. Beauchamp’s circumstances and it is this analysis that yields the most interesting results. According to Wilkes, it is obvious that four of the conditions are satisfied from the start (i.e. the rationality condition, the subject of intentional description condition, the language condition and the consciousness condition), however, it is the third and fourth conditions, which deal with “attitude” and “stance” respectively, that are open to the most controversy.13

With respect to the third condition which demands a specific moral attitude be taken toward persons, it seems that there are arguments in favor of both singularity and plurality. Wilkes notes that doctors treat individuals as single patients. From the start of her treatment, Dr. Prince was trying to bring out the real Ms. Beauchamp. This argument favors singularity.14 However, Wilkes also recognizes that Dr. prince treated the personalities differently insofar as he regarded each personality as an “individual object of concern.”15 Thus, the same condition supports both an argument for a singular person as well as a plurality. Wilkes continues to make at least five arguments in favor of plurality of which only three will be considered here. First, she comments that, “Each of the Beauchamp trio. . .[had] her own, overall character,” implying that a diachronic disunity exists to such an extent that we might conclude there are multiple persons. Second, the personality called “Sally” was conscious and actually interacted with several of the other personalities. Wilkes observes that whenever B1, B2, or B4 was in control, Sally coexisted as a second consciousness aware of all their actions and the thoughts of at least B1 and B2.16 In fact, some personalities did not get along with each other and at times threatened to kill the others (a consequence Dr. Prince warded off by reminding whichever personality was currently conscious of the consequences to itself). Once more, there is such a serious failure of synchronic unity that Wilkes believes there is strong evidence in favor of plurality. Finally, Wilkes notes that from the first-person prospective of Ms. Beauchamp, it must have often seemed that there were in fact multiple people inside her mind. It is hard to imagine a more serious breakdown in synchronic unity than this observation.17

Concerning the Plausibility of Wilkes’s Conclusions and the Relative Strength of Brentano’s Theory

Despite making overtly sound arguments, Wilkes’s conclusions are tenuous at best and her reasoning is wholly erroneous. If we accept Wilkes’s definition of unity—namely that unity consists of not having beliefs with contradictory contents—then her conclusions remain correct. What Brentano calls “parts of a collective” can be considered as synonymous with Wilkes’s disunity of consciousness, and insofar as we accept that within the context of Brentano’s theory multiplicity of parts in one consciousness does not pose a challenge to personal identity, we must also accept—within the context of Wilkes’s theory—that unity of consciousness is not a necessary condition for personhood. However, the theory presented by Wilkes and that of Brentano differ in one very important way: whereas Wilkes claims her examples demonstrate disunity, Brentano would claim that the aforementioned examples show a multiplicity of parts, but nevertheless one unified consciousness.

Furthermore, on its face, we cannot accept Wilkes’s theory at all as it is rooted in faulty logic. For example, Wilkes claims that the case of an agent performing multiple tasks simultaneously is an instance of disunity of consciousness. The problem with such an account is that logically, in order for there to be one person that is doing the multi-tasking, there must be something that is unifying the entire endeavor. Similarly, in the example of the “weak-willed” individual whose desires are inconsistent with each other, there must be some unity of consciousness, or alternatively, a subject of experience that is having the conflict. When subjected to these challenges, Brentano’s theory remains plausible because it retains the unity of consciousness while allowing for a multiplicity of conscious actions. In fact, in her analysis of the “hidden observer” case, it seems that Wilkes implicitly and accidentally acknowledges that Brentano’s understanding of consciousness is a better account of personal identity: “We might even say that [the subject has] two consciousnesses, each perhaps internally united, working simultaneously but separately,” comments Wilkes (italics added).18 This seems to be almost exactly how Brentano would explain the “hidden observer” case—as two parts to a unified consciousness.

Even in the multiple personality case described above, Wilkes’s logic is flawed. It is widely agreed upon that for every thought that occurs, there is an owner (i.e. someone having that thought); or alternatively: thoughts cannot be had independently of a subject having them. Thus, regardless of what seems to be the case there could only be one person having Ms. Beauchamp’s thoughts. In response, Wilkes could claim that her theory actually states that despite apparent multiplicity, a subject has just one conscious state at a time. However, we cannot accept this version of the theory either, nor could Wilkes have intended to advocate such a hypothesis because it would render her argument that Ms. Beauchamp has many simultaneous consciousnesses wholly illogical.

Taken in totality, Wilkes’s reasoning is extremely weak. She often appeals to intuitions in order to save personhood against disunity of consciousness making statements such as, in the case of Bourne, “our actual practice” shows that personhood is maintained or similarly, in the Beauchamp case, she justifies invoking the bodily theory of identity by claiming simply that, “In general, one body per person is just much easier.”19 No commentary is required to point out the obvious weakness inherent in such statements. In fact, using Wilkes’s own six conditions, one could even make the case that Ms. Beauchamp does not qualify for personhood at all as she sometimes is wholly irrational (when one personality has to be reminded not to try to kill another personality because of the obvious consequences, for example) and therefore should not be considered as a viable case to examine in the first place.

Taken in aggregate, Brentano’s theory withstands each one of these challenges. As shown, he can easily explain cases such as the “weak-willed” individual by claiming that the conflicting desires are mere parts to a whole, he can maintain identity in the fugue states by simply showing that there is no synchronic disunity and he can claim—like Wilkes—that the “hidden observer” constitutes a separate, but unified consciousness. Though Wilkes presents interesting cases and raises pertinent questions, her argument is left vulnerable to all too many logical and theoretical flaws to be accepted as valid.□