Commentary on The No No-Miracles Argument Argument, by Daniel
Singer
By Robert
McNamara
Why Analytic and
Continental Philosophy Need Each Other
My commentary on Daniel Singer’s No No-Miracles Argument Argument
is titled Why Analytic and
Continental Philosophy Need Each Other, as in reading Daniel’s essay I came
to a personal revelation concerning the interdependency of these two braches of
philosophy in the pursuit of fundamental truths of the human experience. As a student of the continental school, I have
almost exclusively dealt with the divide between analytic and continental
philosophy. What separates them? What are the relative strengths and
weaknesses inherent in each? Which has
more value? (as a continental student, the answer, for me, is clear). But, in evaluating the essay’s argument, I
came to the realization that continental philosophy is dependent on the
concrete foundation provided by analytic thought, just as the analytic school
requires continental thought to reveal and emphasize the universal implications
of its conclusions. Before I dig too deep into this vein, let me first
summarize Daniel’s No No-Miracles
Argument Argument.
The essay rigorously and
systematically attacks the legitimacy of the No-Miracles Argument as a logical
proof for scientific realism. Once again
for the sake of clarity, the No-Miracles Argument claims that science has
progressed through time and that scientific realism, the understanding that a
real correspondence exists between scientific theories and unobservable objects
and processes in the real world, provides us with a better explanation for this
progress than any other philosophy of science, as any other theory would make
the success of science seem to be a miracle.
Daniel attempts to undermine the argument by claiming that it begs the
question, its reasoning is flawed as one of its premises presupposes the
conclusion.
Daniel goes about his argument by
attacking the No-Miracles Argument’s use of the phrase ‘best explanation’, how
do we decide which explanation of science is best? Through numerous steps of systematic
reasoning, supported by logical proofs, the essay concludes that the values
used to determine the ‘best explanation’ rely on a correspondence theory of truth,
the very value at the heart of scientific realism, itself. The No-Miracles Argument can not logically
prove scientific realism, as its reasoning presupposes a realist point of
view. The No-Miracles Argument begs the
question and has been invalidated by Daniel’s argument.
Now this argument, in itself, was very
interesting to me, but what is truly fascinating about the paper are its
implications on our understanding of science, knowledge, and reality. This is where continental philosophy takes
over, but a continental expansion first required the analytical refutation of
the No-Miracles Argument as its concrete foothold. Analytic philosophy provides the foundations
from which continental philosophers can make grand claims about being and,
conversely, the value of an analytical argument is incredibly narrow if its
implications are not expounded upon by continental thought.
Daniel’s essay, in its negation of a
logical argument for scientific realism, seems to point towards the fact that
belief in science, just as belief in a god, must begin as a matter of
faith. One can not logically prove that
science is true without already presuming its factuality. Once one is immersed within the paradigm of
scientific realism, it may seem logical and inherently true, but one must still
at some point have ‘bought-in’ to realism before this occurs. One must, as with religion, take a leap of
faith of sorts to a belief in science.
Now any scientist, and most people in general, would be very
uncomfortable with this notion. Science
must in some way be inherently reasonable and true in a way that religion is
not. Working within the paradigm of
science faith is not enough, empirical proof must be provided and, likewise,
there must be a proof for the truth in scientific realism. This is the framework from which arguments
such as the No-Miracles Argument arise.
Yet refutations, such as Daniel’s essay, expose the lack of a rational
foundation for initially buying into realism.
One must take a Kierkegaardian leap of faith
to science just as one would have to to religion.
This human desire to logically ground
science’s understanding of the world and reality’s subsequent response of
obscurity and irrationality harkens to Albert Camus’ concept of the absurd, the
tension between the human drive for truth and meaning and the
un-understandability of our world. Camus
writes of man’s desire for truth in an absurd world, “If thought discovered in
the shimmering mirrors of phenomena eternal relations capable of summing
themselves up in a single principle, then would be seen an intellectual joy of
which the myth of the blessed would be but a ridiculous imitation”.1 This human longing for a ‘single principle’
seems to directly parallel scientific realism’s position that one ideal
scientific truth exists concerning the universe. But as David has proven in his refutation of
the No-Miracles Argument, there is no way to initially found the legitimacy of
scientific realism, itself. David has
helped to purport Camus notion that entire existence is without objective
meaning, as we can not fundamentally understand our Being with science or
religion.
Now we have extrapolated the No No-Miracles Argument Argument into two
very large arguments indeed, the argument for the lack of a logical foundation
for scientific realism as well as the argument for the lack of an objective
meaning of existence. This extrapolation
would not have been possible without continental philosophy, but without the
analytical refutations of rational arguments for rationality of scientific
realism, these grand continental arguments would not have a logical leg to
stand on. Throughout the ongoing debate
between these two divergent schools of thought it must never be overlooked that
each side needs the other more than they are willing to admit.□
©Robert McNamara, 2007