Commentary on Can
Non-Reductive Materialism Escape from the Jaws of Epiphenomenalism?, by
Erica Shumener
By Kathy Fazekas,
Erica Shumener argues that anomalous monism, or at least
those arguments for it which she addresses in her paper, cannot escape the jaws
of epiphenomenalism. She discusses Davidson’s
view that it is the event, and not the properties of the event, which causes
other events. Shumener uses the lollipop
example to refute Davidson’s claim that the instantiation of properties of
events do not cause events. As she says,
it is the property purpleness of the lollipop, rather than its spherical
property, that causes a person’s tongue to turn purple.
She adopts the property-exemplification account of events,
which claims that when we say events cause other events, we are really saying
that property-instantiations cause other property-instantiations. Shumener concludes that since Davidson’s
account of event causation is incompatible with the property-exemplification
account of events, his account of anomalous monism does not escape from the
jaws of epiphenomenalism. While
Davidson’s account and the property-exemplification account are clearly
incompatible, I do not see how that leads to the conclusion that epiphenomenalism
trumps anomalous monism. Just because it
appears that the property-exemplification account trumps Donaldson’s account of
event causation by showing that it is properties instantiated in the event, as
opposed to the whole event, which have causal efficacy, does not mean that the spherical
property of the lollipop cannot have causal efficacy for some other event. If an unwrapped lollipop falls on the floor
and rolls, the spherical shape of the lollipop causes it to roll.
Shumener raises the MacDonalds’ claim that aspects of the
property-exemplification account determine the causal efficacy of mental
properties under anomalous monism. According
to the MacDonalds, a mental event causes another event because it co-instantiates
a mental property and physical property.
Since it is the co-instantiation of mental and physical property which
has causal efficacy, the mental property must be distinct from the physical
property and therefore a token mental property is not identical to a token
physical property. As Shumener points
out, since mental properties are not identical to physical properties, the
MacDonalds’ account protects mental properties from epiphenomenalism. It would be helpful to have an example of a
mental event, mental properties, and physical properties to understand the
practical application of Shumener’s argument.
I will try to provide an example of a mental event. If I am driving and a moose runs out in front
of my car, I have the mental event of shock.
According to the MacDonalds, my mental event of shock is a
co-instantiation of the physical property shock and the mental property
shock. I assume the physical property
shock is a chemical/physiological process in my brain and body and the mental
property shock is my consciousness or awareness of shock. Further, it is the co-instantiation of the
physical property shock and the mental property shock which causes me to have
another mental event, say fear, which is in turn a co-instantiation of the
mental property fear and the physical property fear. The MacDonalds argue that since a mental
event reduces to a co-instantiation of a mental property and physical property,
the mental property is not physical and it has causal efficacy. But Shumener disagrees with the MacDonalds
and raises two objections to their argument.
Shumener argues that the co-instantiation of a mental property
and physical property in a mental event is really “the occurrence of two
distinct simple events in addition to the complex mental event” (Shumener 8). But, as Shumener points out, characterizing
the instantiation of each property as a unique simple event, resulting in two
separate events, conflicts with anomalous monism since a token mental event is
supposed to be identical with the token physical event. To which Shumener replies that since a mental
event is the co-instantiation of a mental and physical property, the
instantiation of a mental property (independently of the instantiation of a
physical property) is not sufficient to constitute a mental event—the
instantiation of the mental property is only part of the mental event. But then she returns to the conflict between
the property-exemplification account of events and anomalous monism, and
asserts that if one is to reconcile both accounts, one must admit that a mental
property-instantiation is an event and is not physical. But if it is not physical, then we are back
to the same problem that there are some token mental events which are not
identical to token physical events.
She later claims that since not every co-instantiated property
of a mental event has causal efficacy, it is possible that mental properties do
not have causal efficacy, which results in a victory for epiphenomenalism. But by the same reasoning, we could also
posit that physical properties do not have causal efficacy. She assumes that it is the mental properties,
and not the physical properties, which do not play a role in event causation,
without defending her claim that mental properties may not be causally
efficacious. Nor does she prove that
epiphenomenalism necessarily poses a threat to the co-instantiation account of
events, since she never proves or even explores the possibility that the mental
properties, and not the physical properties, are the ones which are causally
efficacious. If the mental properties
are the ones which are causally efficacious and not the physical ones, then
anomalous monism escapes the jaws of epiphenomenalism.
Her conclusion that the incompatibility of anomalous
monism and the property-exemplification theory of events “entails that, if
mental properties are causally efficacious under anomalous monism, the
anomalous monist is required to adopt a different metaphysical theory of
events” (Shumener 12), is a much stronger point and one I would like to see her
elaborate on in further analysis.□
©Kathy Fazekas, 2007