Commentary on Love’s Fool: Mind and Emotions in the Speech of Alcibiades, by Dan Peterson

 

By Alex Lampros, Penn State University

 

 

I think that this is a terrific essay. Structurally, Peterson’s argument is elegantly developed and well defended. He depicts Nussbaum’s argument using both quotations and plausible interpretations of these remarks. His interpretations’ moreover, are given in clear and accessible prose, which makes his essay that much more readable. He also makes the structure of his argument explicit to the reader by using signposts. What is perhaps most commendable is the fact that his claims are modest and reasonable. Despite his disagreement with Nussbaum’s perspective, his tone is respectful of not only her views, but also the seriousness of the matter addressed. Having said that I would like, nevertheless, to begin with a short defense of Nussbaum’s reading of the text.

In my reading of the Symposium, I feel as though Alcibiades represents a character who can not ascend because he has too much emotion, and as a result is unable to see that particular beauty is akin to all beauty. Peterson posits that, “Alcibiades, as opposed to Socrates, has the requisite emotion for the kind of love necessary for the good life but no true understanding of the rational component necessary for one to generalize love equally to all things.” (14) I think, however, that Nussbaum adequately defends this point when she maintains that, “[erotic passion] fills one part of a life with unstable and venerable activity; thus, according to the Republic, would be sufficient to disqualify it from goodness.1 And it also threatens, when given a part, to overwhelm his whole.”2 In my own words, it seems as though the “black horse” dominates Alcibiades’ soul, moreover, that his “jealous passion” blinds him of truth and good.3 Supporting this claim Robert Cushman, in his book Therapea, observes, “These opportunities [for heavenly vision] are lost to men through their preoccupation with things of appetite… Hence an inferior love obstructs knowledge and occasions ignorance. In so far as the appetitive eros enforces its rule and impedes the upsurge of the mind towards intelligible reality, it is responsible for the soul’s loss of wings.”4

Moreover, I tend to agree with the position of G. R. F. Ferrari who, in his essay, “Platonic Love” holds, “Instead of loving wisdom, he [Alcibiades] falls in love with the wisdom lover – exactly the danger Diotima attempts to exclude from her ladder of love by banishing individuals from the center of attention when the rung of philosophy has been reached.”5 Ferrari also lends backing to a critique of the unified theory of love when he explains that in the Symposium, Diotima addresses the honor lovers in the lesser mysteries6 and the wisdom lovers in the greater mysteries7 individually; whereas in the Phaedrus Socrates combines the idea of the two lovers to create the “inspired lover”. Moreover, in his words he writes, “This is further evidence that Plato is not concerned to propound a comprehensive and unified theory of love – if any were needed in addition to the way we have seen love to be treated (that is, exploited) in the two dialogues.”8

          Regarding the connection between the two texts, Peterson writes, “If this parallel between the two dialogues is valid, it is the positive madness alone that Plato would associate with the first step of the ascension process since it is the only one that leads to beauty” (10). He supports the antecedent of this if-then statement by positing, “It seems that Plato has not changed his theory as Nussbaum suggests since beauty is still the object of love…” (10-11). Ferrari contradicts this when he writes, “Indeed, the good is the only object of love.”9 Diotima confirms this when she explains, “That’s because what everyone loves is really nothing other than the good” (205E – 206A). Thus positive madness is not associated with Alcibiades on the first step of the ascension process as Peterson concludes.

          In his “Question Concerning Technology”, Martin Heidegger declares that questioning is the piety of thought.10 And this is exactly what Peterson does, he questions the sources he reads, and refuses to be spoon-fed someone else’s convictions. Personally, I happen to agree with Nussbaum; but applaud Peterson’s efforts to take her to task in such an articulate manner. □

 

          ©Alex Lampros, 2007