Commentary on The Unity of Consciousness in
"Real People," by Eric
Grossman
By Lori Lepelletier, The
Impressions,
Imprints, Residue, and the Midden that Unearth Glimpses of Reconciliation
Kathleen Wilkes's theory on the "Unity of
Consciousness" is fairly presented in this paper. The examples and
given shortcomings of the arguments are illuminated with respect to the
position.
To begin I would like to state that I am not an expert in
Wilkes or Brentano. In preparing for
this presentation I read Brentano’s chapter on the unity of consciousness in Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint,
as cited by the author.1 I looked for a place in which Brentano and
Wilkes overlap. Through my research I
also came to sympathize with Brentano’s position over Wilkes’s.
I would like to raise, is there a place where Brentano and
Wilkes could agree on the use of the body as a unifying consciousness? In reading Brentano I came upon a passage
which indicated there might be. If goes as
follows,
The
belief that the self is a corporeal organ which forms the substrate of
continuous substantial changes would not contradict [Brentano's] previous
statements, provided that whoever might hold such a belief admits that the
impressions experienced by such an organ exert an influence upon the way in
which it renews itself.2
He
continues by comparing this to the way in which "a wound leaves a scar.”3
So, Brentano offers a place where we
could accept the “bodily theory of identity,” that is, he would accept it if
there were impressions left over time by the experience of the body. From a broader reading, does Wilkes defend or
even approach the idea of memories leaving a residue? From the breakdown provided in this paper,
she would not. And so, Brentano and
Wilkes cannot have a common agreement on a bodily definition of unity.
As stated by my colleague, "the
theory presented by Wilkes and that of Brentano differ in one very important
way: whereas Wilkes claims her examples demonstrate disunity, Brentano would
claim that the aforementioned examples show a multiplicity of parts, but
nevertheless one unified consciousness."4
Brentano further supports the theory of an underlying
unity of consciousness with an example with acknowledgement of the presentation
of differences. "Neither a blind man or a deaf man could compare
colors with sounds" as you or I who observe them simultaneously.5 If the blind man were to describe the
perceived sound and the deaf man to describe the perceived color, Brentano
states it to be "absurd" to say that "the two together [perceiving
with their separate realities] can recognize the relationship" of the
color to the sound.6
For Brentano it is "the cognition which compares [colors
and sounds, that] is [the] real objective unity, but when we combine the acts
of the blind man and the deaf man, we always get a mere collective and never a
unitary real thing.”7 Brentano continues, "Only if sound and color are presented jointly, in one
and the same reality, is it conceivable that they can be compared with one
another.”8
Brentano offers a way in which there could be a unity of identity
through the notion of one piece of consciousness having an impression on
another. Wilkes does not ultimately
agree that such an impression would take place.
I believe that an impression would be necessary.
A further consideration of Wilkes’s theory of personhood
and a continuality of consciousness. All
human beings, if they are going to be considered persons, must have the six
conditions of personhood.9 These conditions must be continuous
throughout time for an individual to be a person. I believe that the most plausible
interpretation is that these six conditions would have to leave
impressions.
Brentano speaks of "the unity of the self in its past
and present existence" as a stream and waves imitating their predecessor.10
With the six conditions of personhood giving defining characteristics and
distinct rules to be applied cross-bodily to all human bodies, even if it is
being contended that she is ultimately erroneous in her arguments, if these
columns of charted necessities where to be labeled and therefore pulled out (excavated)
would they not leave an imprint, a midden?
Picture a structure with six columns. The headings
for each being one of the six conditions of personhood. With these
distinct columns present, what effect – if any – do they hold on defining what
is consciousness. And by contributing to
this definition, is there not then a unity? Wilkes argues for the norm
being disunity but each individual's consciousness must be defined (to have the
label of personhood) in the same way. There is a commonality presented by
Wilkes. How would she defend that this does not impose a type of unity?
I would like to go into this deeper but given the
significant power that language holds in what defines a human as a person, it
is difficult to say that it would leave an impression on the human
consciousness from day to day.□
©Lori
Lepelletier, 2007
1 As well as sections from the text, Kathleen V. Wilkes, Real People: Personal Identity Without Thought Experiments, (Oxford New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1988).
2 Franz Clemens Brentano, Oskar Kraus and Linda L. McAlister, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, International Library of Philosophy and Scientific Method, (New York,: Humanities Press, 1973) 168.