The Need For Husserl’s Rational
Intersubjectivity To Prevent Further Adverse Effects Of Science &
Technology On Life & Ethics
By Gabrielle Aruta,
The
metaphysical foundation of Western thought has unavoidably led to the technological
domination and exploitation of the world. For this reason, I presently take up
the question concerning science and technology given that the adverse affects
of these fields, emerge as a central problem of our era. Many people place
naïve faith in science to solve all conceivable questions without taking into
account what Edmund Husserl calls the “Crisis of Science.” This results from
not realizing the importance of critically examining the subjective and
objective components of experience and their essential correlation, which is
vital to Husserl’s phenomenology.
Currently, we are at a juncture when serious a reinterpretation is needed for the old foundation of scientific thought, that is, science and technology must become actively engaged in a phenomenological reduction and begin to self-criticize. Similarly, there needs to be an emphasis on the grappling that scientists have to do over “mounting perplexities and moral problems posed by their astonishing findings,” as “it seems that enlarged control over nature is brought at the price of diminished intelligibility.”1
Hence, I offer this paper as a response to Heidegger’s
acknowledgment that there is no traditional philosophical remedy to the serious
problems, which science and technology inflict on society and the essence of
man’s existence. However, it is my intention to show that Husserl’s
phenomenological method, most especially his call for the epochè of one’s doxa,
will provide such a remedy and reveal greater insight to the essences of
science and technology by means of a transcendental intersubjectivity, to
determine technologies positive and negative elements. I believe it is of the
utmost importance to determine a clarified final understanding of the
implications of science & technology on life and ethics. It must be
understood that technology is often a means of manipulating the environment for
humans desired ends and thus presents us with various moral concerns about its
application in our lives. In lieu of this humans need to strive towards an
ethical approach to science and technology which, “entails the development of
normative strategies directed toward the achievement or approximation of a
moral ideal.”2 Again,
to achieve a transcendental enlightenment of how science “ought” to conduct itself,
Husserl’s phenomenological reduction is a necessary first step.
In, The Question
Concerning Technology, Heidegger wrote that in truth, “nowhere does man
today any longer encounter himself or, his essence,” which is precisely why I
believe that a phenomenological reorganization of the world is needed.3
In the words of Husserl, we need to turn our attention back to “the things
themselves” or the impressions made by the mind to question or perhaps even
justify technologies adverse affects. Before I begin my criticism on the
dangers of science and technology I must make a significant distinction between
the form of technology I see as positive aspect to society, and the kind that
both Husserl and Heidegger along with myself, see as a danger.
The form of science and technology that is excluded from
my criticism is an anthropological
understanding of technology, which pertains to the body of knowledge available a society to implement scientific
discoveries for practical and helpful purposes. Heidegger views this as the
fundamental “techne of poiesis”4
and describes it as receptive and contemplative, in that it inclines us to
responsibly Care for our Projects and has a certain quality which can disclose
the essence of our Da-sein.
Conversely, the dangerous form of technology is modern
technology which exploits the scientific method for the purpose of achieving
particular commercial or industrial objectives with no thought of how it
affects the human condition or the Life-World in which we reside. It seems as
though modern technology assumes little responsibility for its negative effect
on nature, human beings and especially on beings relationship with others. What
I intend to show is that the rational intersubjectivity found in Husserl’s
transcendental phenomenology is the tool needed to overcome the present
technological crisis. I believe that phenomenology will act as an objectivist
program of pure logic protecting the human condition from the adverse affects
of modern technology.
Historically the
channel of communication between science and philosophy has been strained but
we need to overcome the traditional barriers concerning this issue to expound
positive solutions for society. Science continually posits false meaning
claims, asserting that it alone can comprehend all knowledge including that of
our existence. This intrusion of technology depletes and destroys the
importance of human life. As it continues to advance, it will further conceal
our true nature or the essence of our Da-sein
that Heidegger is so concerned about revealing.
The devastating effects of their progression have lead to
many problems based on science lacking an awareness of its own inauthentic
subjective nature. The utter lack of objectivity and valid truth in our world
due to personal subjectivity, divulges our complete objectification of natural
resources, other human beings, and the intersubjective Life-World. In the final
analysis, this will further lead to a greater loss of Intelligibility by reducing our cognitive skills to what Heidegger
calls, “technical information processing.”5
Thus, it is certain that we need use the full capacity of
our reason to move beyond the problematic nature of science of technology and I
suggest that we look at this challenging scenario through the lens of a
Husserlian phenomenological reduction. People must come to realize that science
and technology cannot alone cope with the problems of absolute truth and
validity, however, individuals are so absorbed in the Everydayness of the
Natural Attitude that we have become unaware of others. I think focusing our
attention on the understanding that we actualize our identity based on Mitsein or our relationship with others
is a simple realization that becomes the catalyst for a phenomenological
reduction. For, to know the concerns of the other, can be our guide through the
phenomenological process.
This comprehensive notion of Otherness is significant to
those in a position of leadership in the fields of science and technology, who
must come understand the great need for revisiting intersubjectivity. They must
embrace the significance of dialectic between the self and others to realize
how important a role their works plays in society. I believe that a practical
application of phenomenological insights is central to focus on the
constitution of otherness. If people were to take the time to seek knowledge
about other human beings then perhaps individuals would not make such selfish
decisions, since to know others leads to a better understanding of oneself. Essential,
it is the directedness of our consciousness towards objects and others that
will make us better people.
Martin Heidegger gives an ontological critique of the
origins and imperfections of science and technology, identifying it as the main
source of dilemmas and conflicts. Heidegger essentially does not want the world
to be seen as an object to be used or controlled. “The aim of Heidegger’s
analysis of the origin of technology is to show how the scientific
objectification and manipulation of entities in-the-world takes place on the
primordially nonsubstantive and nonconceptualizable domain of Being.”6
Here Heidegger’s “method is predominantly phenomenological in relation to
ontology, by focusing on the process of the revealing/concealing of Being.”7
For Heidegger the great threat to human existence is that thinking has become a
kind of technical information processing. Thinking, like our Da-sein has become a background reality,
it had previously meant something very important but lost its meaning in language
somewhere. Heidegger foresaw this problem leading to a fundamental
“homelessness and rootlessness of our essence. However, he writes that, “thinking philosophically and poeticizing are both ways of
guarding the essential nature of the human relation with Being”8
Although, modern technology presented itself as a problem
to Heidegger he also was able to see the significance of its fundamental Revealing characteristic. “The revealing
that rules in modern technology is a challenging Herausfordern, which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that
it supply energy that can be extracted and stored.”9
In describing the essence of technology, Heidegger writes that surprisingly it
is not technological, “thus we shall never experience our relationship to the essence
of technology so long as we merely conceive and push forward the technological,
put up with it, or evade it.”10 Objects begin to lose their character when caught up in
the “standing-reserve” Bestand when they are always
present-at-hand. This challenge of nature places it as a means to a means in
most cases and makes sure the resources are always at our command. As we push
nature to its limits, technology also challenges human beings into the process
of ordering. Here, human beings are made subordinate to the industries in which
they work. Technology as it advances creates impressive machines that function
as autonomous tools however this reduces the importance of cognitive ability. Undoubtedly,
the earth is challenged in many ways by technology, Heidegger explained, but
that challenging still has a revealing nature
Technology not only serves as a means of accomplishing
projects, it is also a way of disclosing and revealing Being.
However, it is a form of revealing that also uses up the material which it is
setting forth. It turns nature into a stockpile of resources. The nature of
this technological revealing is such that it obscures and does not reveal its
own essence. Furthermore, it transforms the humans who are involved in
technology. “Heidegger’s view is that, in the promotion of efficiency,
flexibility, and control, humans become the tools of their own technology, and
the human itself becomes resource.”11
Far too many people today get caught up in the structural
feature of running away from responsibility, what Heidegger calls Falling. In this process humans continue to lose the essence
of their Being for the sake of manipulating others or nature. However, I
believe that the total lack of ethical behavior will be overcome by
implementing Husserl’s rational intersubjectivity. Actualizing an Authentic Da-sein or transcending to the
Phenomenological Attitude is what will allow us to overcome the problematic
nature of modern technology.
We cannot continue to allow the destructiveness generated
by neglect, unpredictability, or shortsightedness to keep humans trapped in the
empirical ego and suffering the negative effects of technology. Science and
technology need to phenomenological reduce their various modalities of judgment
to achieve objective and valid truth without positing false knowledge claims. According
to Husserl, our final foundation of truth is to be based on the universal
self-reflection of phenomenology. This will leave society with a
phenomenological and existential fulfillment of human existence.
For Husserl the roots and beginnings of knowledge are to
be found in “the things themselves” and involve a turn to the object itself. Husserl
blamed the crisis being discussed, that of the European sciences, on “the split
between Galilean objectivism and Cartesian subjectivism.”12
This stemmed Positivistic science and the study of mere facts, which Husserl
determined to be why science had lost its meaning and even impaired our
comprehension of the purpose of man’s existence in the process. On this topic,
Herbert Spiegelberg wrote that, “the incapacity and unwillingness of science to
face problems of value and meaning because of its confinement to mere positive
facts seemed to Husserl to be the very root of the crisis of science and of
mankind itself.”13
Husserl’s method determines that we can only abstract
understanding from what is “given” in experience. To do so, we are called upon
to invoke the “pure” reflective method of phenomenology. For Husserl our
logical conceptions of technology originate in intuition and arise on the basis
of certain experiences. So to fully understand the affects of science we must
investigate the, “’pure categories of meaning,’ which were described as the
primitive concepts that ‘make possible’ our objective nexus of knowledge.”14
I believe Husserl’s descriptive clarification of
phenomenology will allow us to better come to know objective truth in matters
concerning technology. To this effect, Marvin Farber wrote that, “…our
knowledge of the hitherto unrecognized elements may be increased by the greater
thoroughness made possible by practiced reflection and the explicit use of
the phenomenological epochè is a
great aid in this procedure.”15
I think that Farber’s insight quoted above is important
because objective clarification is precisely needed when investigating the
problematic nature of science and technology. That essential clarification is
further developed in “Husserl’s theory of the constitution of
intersubjectivity, which is the process of directing intentional acts to
correlated objective meanings. This can provide important guidance for a
persuasive account of the progress whereby one subject comes to objectively
know another.”16
Despite the many negative elements of science and
technology both Husserl and Heidegger wrote about the potentially positive
aspects as well. While technology is clearly a vast problem, Heidegger views it
as a potential “saving grace” from which a new disclosure of Being
emerges. He saw in technology the traces of that authentic relation to the
world and to Being. Heidegger wants us to “Step-Back”
and work through the problems existing within the framework of our Gestell. It is at this precise point
that I believe we need to heed Heidegger’s advice vis-à-vis returning to
Husserl’s epochè and the
phenomenological reduction. From this more rational position individuals will be
able to better perceive the problematic roots of the Western tradition of
metaphysics. This is the opportunity to implement phenomenology as a return to
beginnings and a tool for illuminating the Hiddenness-of-Truth. Similarly,
Husserl’s science of philosophy sees technology as having the ‘chance of making
life itself more significant,’ which we need to focus on. For, technology might
aid in the realization of man’s fundamental purpose in life. For, Husserl felt a
great sense of responsibility for his cause Sachen and had impossibly high aspirations for himself and his
method.
Clearly, both Heidegger and Husserl wanted to overcome the
global hegemony and overwhelming problems of the scientific era. To do so, I do
not think it is necessary to systematical follow Husserl and Heidegger on the
many twists and turns of their philosophical developments but rather to extract
certain essential components to procure their most positive and helpful
aspects. I believe in the possibility of having an ideal encounter with Science
and Technology but that is contingent upon an active engagement in
philosophizing. If not, we will continue to exist in the Natural Attitude or
mundane Everydayness; allowing social, cultural and environmental dilemmas to
grow. We will remain unfree with a loss of direction and chained to the
destructive capacity of technology that continues to reduce cognitive ability
to mere “technical information processing.”
Accordingly, there is a immense need for the rational
intersubjectivity found in Husserl’s Transcendental Phenomenology to thwart
what Heidegger calls in Being & Time,
the impending ‘Transcendental Homelessness’ of our Da-sein. This seems imminent vis-à-vis the overwhelming
deconstruction of cognitive abilities due to the ‘Instrumental conception of
Technology’.17
This
is the paramount challenge to our times and as Husserl and Heidegger concluded,
there is no traditional or specific remedy for this problem. That is why I
propose a merging of the rational intersubjectivity found in Husserl’s
Transcendental Phenomenology with Heidegger’s Fundamental Ontology, and
Hermeneutics. Finally, I call on society to rethink the tradition of Western
thought and turn to new beginning, while applying a familiar phenomenological
method, to improve the restlessness of our undirected lives and save future
generations from further adverse affects technological on our lives and
personal ethics.Ç
© Gabrielle Aruta,
2006
Works Cited:
Lisa D.
Campolo, “Derrida and Heidegger: The Critique of Technology and the Call to
Care,” Journal of the
Marvin
Farber, “The Function of Phenomenological Analysis,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Jun.,
1941), 431-441
Kathleen
M. Haney, Intersubjectivity Revisited:
Phenomenology and the Other,
Martin
Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology and Other
Essays,
Steven
Heine, “Philosophy for an ‘Age of Death’: The Critique of Science and
Technology in Heidegger and Nishitani,” Philosophy
East and West, Vol. 40, No. 2 (Arp., 1990),
175-193
Edmund
Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and
Transcendental Phenomenology,
Edmund
Husserl, Phenomenology & Crisis of
Philosophy,
Dermot
Moran, Introduction to Phenomenology,
David
Papineau, Western Philosophy: An
Illustrated Guide,
Herbert
Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical
Introduction,
Notes
1 Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical
Introduction, p. 78.
2 Lisa D. Campolo, Derrida and Heidegger: The Critique of Technology and the Call to Care,
p. 431.
3 Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology
4 Ibid, p. 13.
5 Dermot Moran, Introduction
to Phenomenology, p. 244.
6 Steven Heine, Philosophy
for an ‘Age of Death’: The Critique of Science and Technology in Heidegger and
Nishitani, p. 179.
7 Ibid, p. 178.
8 Dermot Moran, p. 244.
9 Martin Heidegger, Question Concerning Technology, p. 14.
10 Ibid, p. 4.
11 Brenda Almond, Western
Philosophy, p. 168.
12 Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction, p. 79.
13Ibid, p. 80.
14 Marvin Farber, The Function of Phenomenological Analysis, p. 434.
15 Ibid, p. 433.
16 Kathleen M. Haney, Intersubjectivity Revisited: Phenomenology
and the Other, p. X.
17 Martin Heidegger, p. 5.