

Chapter XI Quotations of Voices

Vox . . .
Nympha fugax
 (Voice . . . fleeing nymph)
 G. Cossart, *Orationes et Carmina*,
 1675¹

ROBINSON CRUSOE already indicated himself how a crack appeared in his scriptural empire. For a time, his enterprise was in fact interrupted, and haunted, by an absent other that returned to the shores of the island, by "the print of a man's naked foot on the shore." The instability of the limits set: the frontier yields to something foreign. On the margins of the page, the mark of an "apparition" disturbs the order that a capitalizing and methodical labor had constructed. It elicits "fluttering thoughts," "whimsies," and "terror" in Robinson Crusoe.² The conquering bourgeois is transformed into a man "beside himself," made wild himself by this (wild) clue that reveals nothing. He is almost driven out of his mind. He dreams, and has nightmares. He loses his confidence in a world governed by the Great Clockmaker. His arguments abandon him. Driven out of the productive asceticism that took the place of meaning for him, he lives through diabolical day after day, obsessed by the cannibalistic desire to devour the unknown intruder or by the fear of being devoured himself.

On the written page, there thus appears a smudge—like the scribbling of a child on the book which is the local authority. A lapse insinuates itself into language. The territory of appropriation is altered by the mark of something which is not there and does not happen (like myth).³ Robinson will see someone (Friday) and will recover the power of mastery when he has the opportunity to see, that is, when the absent other shows himself. Then he will be once again within his order. Disorder is due to the mark of something past and passing, to the "practically nothing" of a passing-by. The violence that oscillates between the drive to devour and the fear of being eaten arises from what we could

call a "presence of absence," following Hadewijch of Antwerp. The other, here, does not constitute a system hidden beneath the one Robinson writes. The island is not a palimpsest in which it is possible to reveal, decode, and decipher a system covered up by an order that is superimposed on it but of the same type. What marks itself and passes on has no text of its own (*texte propre*). The latter is spoken only by the owner's discourse (*le discours du propriétaire*) and resides only in his place. The only language available to difference is interpretive delirium—the dreams and "whimsies" of Robinson himself.

Defoe's 1719 novel already indicates the nowhere (a trace or mark, which eats into borders) and the fantastic modality (an interpretive madness) of what will intervene as voice in the field of writing, even though Defoe considers only a silent marking of the text by small part of the body (a bare foot), and not the voice itself, which is a marking of language by the body. He also gives this form and these modalities a name: they have to do, Robinson says, with something *wild*. Naming is not here the "painting" of a reality any more than it is elsewhere; it is a performative act organizing what it enunciates. It does what it says, and constitutes the savagery it declares. Just as one excommunicates by naming, the name "wild" both creates and defines what the scriptural economy situates outside of itself. It is moreover immediately given its essential predicate: the wild is transitory; it marks itself (by smudges, lapses, etc.) but it does not write itself. It alters a place (it disturbs), but it does not establish a place.

The "theoretical fiction" invented by Defoe thus outlines a *form* of alterity in relation to writing, a form that will also impose its identity on the voice, since when Friday appears, he is confronted by an alternative destined to have a long history: he must either cry out (a "wild" outbreak that calls for interpretation and correction through pedagogical—or psychiatric—treatment) or else make his body the vehicle of the dominant language (by becoming "his master's voice," a docile body that executes the order, incarnates reason and receives the status of being a substitute for enunciation, and is thus no longer the act but the acting out of the other's "saying"). In turn, the voice will also insinuate itself into the text as a mark or trace, an effect or metonymy of the body, a transitory citation like Cossart's "nymph"—*Nympha fugax*, a transitory fugitive, an indiscreet ghost, a "pagan" or "wild" reminiscence in the scriptural economy, a disturbing sound from a different tradition, and a pre-text for interminable interpretive productions.

We must still determine a few of the historical forms imposed on orality by the end of its confinement. Because of its exclusion on the grounds of economic neatness and efficiency, the voice appears essentially in the form of *quotation*, which is homologous, in the field of the written, with the mark of the bare foot left on Robinson's island. In scriptural culture, quotation links interpretive effects (it makes the production of texts possible) and effects of alteration (it dis-quiets the text). It operates between these two poles defining its extreme forms: on the one hand, the *quotation-pre-text*, which serves to fabricate texts (assumed to be commentaries or analyses) on the basis of relics selected from an oral tradition functioning as an authority; on the other, the *quotation-remembrance*, marking in language the fragmented and unexpected return (like the intrusion of voices from outside) of oral relationships that are structuring but repressed by the written. These seem to be limiting cases, beyond which we are no longer concerned with the voice. In the first case, quotations become the means by which discourse proliferates; in the second, it lets them out and they interrupt it.

Focusing only on these two variants, I shall call the first "the science of fables" (from the name it was so frequently given in the eighteenth century), and the second "returns and turns of voices" ("*retours et tours de voix*") (since their returns, like those of swallows in the spring, are accompanied by subtle modalities and procedures, in the manner of the turns or tropes of rhetoric, and take the form of itineraries that squat on unoccupied lands, of "films for voices," as Marguerite Duras puts it, of ephemeral rounds—"un petit tour et puis s'en va"). The outline of these two forms can serve as a preliminary to the examination of oral practices, by making clear a few aspects of the framework that still leaves voices ways of speaking.

Displaced enunciation

A general problematic traverses and determines these forms and must be recalled in introducing them. I shall approach it from its linguistic side. From this point of view, Robinson Crusoe participates in and refers to an historical displacement of the problem of enunciation, that is to say, of the "act of speaking" or *speech-act*. The problem of the speaker and of his identity became acute with the breakdown of the world that was assumed to be spoken and speaking: who speaks when there is no longer a divine Speaker who founds every particular enunciation? The question

was apparently settled by the system that furnished the subject with a place guaranteed and measured by his scriptural production.⁴ In a laissez-faire economy where isolated and competitive activities are supposed to contribute to a general rationality, the work of writing gives birth to both the product and its author. Henceforth, in theory, there is no longer any need for voices in these industrious workshops. Thus the classical age had as its primary task the creation of scientific and technical "languages" separated from nature and intended to transform it (an act symbolized by Robinson's act of beginning his project by writing his journal, or "record book" ("*livre de raison*")); each of these systems of "writing" (*écritures*) places its "bourgeois" producers beyond doubt and confirms the conquests that this autonomous instrument allows them to make on the body of the world.

A new king comes into being: the individual subject, an imperceptible master. The privilege of being himself the god that was formerly "separated" from his creation and defined by a *genesis* is transferred to the man shaped by enlightened culture. Of course, the bourgeois heirs of the Judeo-Christian God make a selection among his attributes: the new god writes, but he does not speak; he is an author, but he is not grasped corporeally in an interlocution. The disturbance of enunciation is thus liquidated a priori, before coming back to us today as the problem of communication. The growing fabrication of objective schedulings, put under the banner of "progress," can also be regarded as the autobiographical story of its promoters: their achievements tell their story. The history that is made is their history, by a double break which on the one hand isolates operations, subjects of power and knowledge, and on the other, reduces nature to the status of an inexhaustible fund against the background of which its products appear and from which they are wrested. The immunity from which these new creators benefit in their solitude, and the inertia of the nature which is provided for their expeditions: these two historical postulates have broken off oral communications between the masters (who do not speak) and the universe (which no longer speaks), and made possible, over the past three centuries, the over-emphasized labor which mediates their relations and which, fabricating men-gods, transforming the universe, becomes the central and silent strategy of a new history.

However, the question that was theoretically eliminated by this labor returns to haunt us: who is speaking? to whom? But it reappears outside of this writing that has been transformed into a means and an effect of

production. It arises *alongside*, coming from beyond the frontiers reached by the expansion of the scriptural enterprise. "Something" *different* speaks again and presents itself to the masters in the various forms of non-labor—the savage, the madman, the child, even woman; then, often recapitulating the preceding, in the form of a voice or the cries of the People excluded from the written; and still later, under the sign of the unconscious, the language that is supposed to continue to "speak" in the bourgeois and the "intellectuals" without their knowing it. Here we see a kind of speech emerging or maintaining itself, but as what "escapes" from the domination of a sociocultural economy, from the organization of reason, from the grasp of education, from the power of an elite and, finally, from the control of the enlightened consciousness.

To each form of this alien enunciation corresponds a scientific and social mobilization: civilizing colonization, psychiatry, pedagogy, the education of the people, psychoanalysis, etc.—ways of re-establishing writing in these emancipated areas. But the important thing here is rather the phenomenon that serves as a point of departure (and a vanishing point) for all these reconquests: the displacement of *saying* (speech) and *doing* (writing) from their central position. *The place from which one speaks is outside the scriptural enterprise.* The uttering occurs outside the places in which systems of statements are composed. One no longer knows where speaking comes from, and one understands less and less how writing, which articulates power, could speak.

The first victim of this dichotomy was no doubt rhetoric: it claimed to make out of speech a way of manipulating the other's will, establishing adhesions and contracts, coordinating or modifying social practices, and thus shaping history. It has gradually been excluded from the area of the sciences. And it is not accidental that it reappears where legends prosper; or that Freud re-establishes it in the exiled and unproductive area of dreams in which an unconscious sort of "speech" makes its return. This division, already so clear in the eighteenth century in growing opposition between techniques (or sciences) and *opera*,⁵ or, more specifically, in the linguistic distinction between the consonant (which is written reason) and the vowel (which is breath, a special effect of the body),⁶ seems finally to have received its scientific status and legitimacy in the distinction Saussure established between "*langue*" and "*parole*." Thus, the "primordial thesis" (Hjelmslev) of the *Course in General Linguistics* separates the "social" from the "individual," and the "essential" from "what is accessory and more or less accidental."⁷ It presupposes as well

that "*langue (langue)* exists only in order to govern *speech acts (parole)*."⁸ The corollaries which specify this thesis (itself dependent on the Saussurian "first principle," i.e., the arbitrariness of the sign), and which oppose the synchronic to discrete occurrences, indicate the tradition Saussure generalizes by elevating it to the status of a science, a tradition which, through two centuries of history, has constituted as the postulate of scriptural enterprise the break between the statement (an object that can be written) and enunciation (the act of speaking). This does not, of course, take into consideration another ideological tradition also present in Saussure's work, the tradition which opposes the "creativity" of the speech-act to the "system of language."⁹

Even displaced, set aside or considered as a remainder, enunciation cannot be dissociated from the system of statements. To point out only two socio-historical forms of this re-articulation, we can distinguish between writing's effort to master the "voice" that it cannot be but without which it nevertheless cannot exist, on the one hand, and the illegible returns of voices cutting across statements and moving like strangers through the house of language, like imagination.

The science of fables

Taking up first the *science of fables*, we find that it touches on all the learned or elitist hermeneutics of speech—of savage, religious, insane, childlike, or popular speech—as they have been elaborated over the past two centuries by ethnology, "the science of religions," psychiatry, pedagogy and political or historiographical procedures seeking to introduce the "voice of the people" into the authorized language. An immense field, reaching from the "explanations" of ancient or exotic fables in the eighteenth century to the pioneering work of Oscar Lewis in "giving a voice" to the *Children of Sanchez* and a point of departure for so many "life stories."¹⁰ These different "heterologies" (sciences of the different) have the common characteristic of attempting to *write the voice*. The voice reaching us from a great distance must find a place in the text. Thus primitive orality has to be written in the ethnological discourse: the "genius" of "mythologies" and religious "fables" (as the *Encyclopédie* puts it) has to be written in a scholarly discipline, or the "voice of the people" has to be written in Michelet's historiography. What is audible, but far away, will thus be transformed into texts in conformity with the Western desire to read its products.

The heterological operations seems to depend on the fulfillment of two conditions: an object, defined as a "fable," and an instrument, translation. To define the position of the other (primitive, religious, mad, childlike, or popular) as a "fable" is not merely to identify it with "what speaks" (*fari*), but with a speech that "does not know" what it says. When it is serious, enlightened or scientific analysis does indeed assume that something essential is expressed in the myths produced by the primitive, the dogmas of the believer, the child's babbling, the language of dreams or the gnomic conversations of common people, but it also assumes that these forms of speech do not understand what they say that is important. The "fable" is thus a word full of meaning, but what it says "implicitly" becomes "explicit" only through scholarly exegesis. By this trick, research accords itself in advance, through its very object, a certain necessity and a location. It is sure of being always able to place interpretation in the lack of knowledge that undercuts the fable's speech. Surreptitiously, the distance from which the foreign voice comes is transformed into the gap that separates the concealed (unconscious) truth of the voice from the lure of its manifestation. The domination of scriptural labor is thus founded *de jure* by the very "fable" structure that is in reality its historical product.

There exists an instrument allowing this domination to pass from a *de jure* to a *de facto* status: *translation*. This is a mechanism, perfected over the generations, that makes it possible to move from one language to another, to eliminate exteriority by transferring it to interiority, and to transform the unpredictable or non-sensical "noises" uttered by voices into (scriptural, produced, and "comprehended") "messages." As one can still see in Hjelmslev's work, this notion of translation assumes the "translatability" of all languages (whether iconic, gestural, or voiced) into "natural everyday language." On the basis of this axiom, analysis can reduce all expressions to the form that has been developed in a particular field but which is assumed to be "non-specific" and endowed with a "universal character."¹¹ From that point on, all the successive operations become legitimate: transcription, which changes the oral into the written; the construction of a model which treats the fable as a linguistic system; the production of a meaning, which results from the working of this model on what has been changed into a text; etc. It is impossible to consider each of the stages of the factory-like labor that thus transforms the material given it in the form of a "fable" into written and readable cultural products. I would stress only the importance of

transcription, a common practice considered as obviously justified, for, by first substituting the written for the oral (for example, in the transcription of a folk tale), it makes it possible to believe that the written product of the analysis made on this written document has something to do with oral literature.

These tricks guaranteeing in advance the success of scriptural operations have, however, a strange fact as the condition of their possibility. In contrast to the so-called exact sciences, whose development is determined by the autonomy of a field of research, "heterological" sciences engender their products by means of a passage through or by way of the other. They advance according to a "sexual" process that posits the arrival of the other, the different, as a detour necessary for their progress. In the perspectives we have adopted here, that means that orality remains indefinitely something exterior without which writing does not function. *The voice makes people write*. Such is the relationship Michelet's historiography has to "the voice of the people," which nevertheless, he says, he has never "succeeded in making speak"; such also is the relationship Freud's psychoanalytic writing has to his patient Dora's pleasure, which "eluded" him all through the oral exchange in her treatment.

From ethnology to pedagogy, we see that the guaranteed success of writing hinges on an initial defeat and lack, as if discourse were constructed as the result and occultation of a loss that is the condition of its possibility, as if the meaning of all scriptural conquests were that they multiply products that substitute for an absent voice, without ever succeeding in capturing it, in bringing it inside the frontiers of the text, in suppressing it as an alien element. In other words, modern writing cannot be in the place of presence. We have already seen that scriptural practice arises precisely from a gap between presence and the system. It is formed on the basis of a fracture in the antique unity of the Scripture that spoke. Its condition is its non-identity with itself.

All "heterological" literature can thus be considered as the result of this fracture. It tells both what it does with orality (it alters it) and it remains altered with and by the voice. Texts thus express an altered voice in the writing the voice makes necessary by its insurmountable difference. In this literature, we have thus a first image of the voice simultaneously "cited" (as before a court of law) and "altered"—a lost voice, erased even within the object itself (the "fable") whose scriptural construction it makes possible. But this "sexual" functioning of heterological writing, a functioning that never succeeds entirely, transforms it

into an erotics: it is the inaccessibility of its "object" that makes it produce.

The sounds of the body

From this formation, I shall distinguish another modern figure: the "voices of the body." An example of this other scene is furnished by the opera, which gradually established itself at around the same time the scriptural model organized techniques and social practices in the eighteenth century. A space for voices, the opera allows an enunciation to speak that in its most elevated moments detaches itself from statements, disturbs and interferes with syntax, and wounds or pleasures, in the audience, those places in the body that have no language either. Thus in Verdi's *Macbeth*, in Lady Macbeth's mad aria, the voice that is at first supported by the orchestra soon continues alone after the orchestra has fallen silent, follows the curve of the melody a moment longer, vacillates, slowly slips away from its path, gets lost and finally disappears into silence. One voice among others breaching the discourse in which it constitutes a parenthesis and a deviation.

On the modern stage the oral trajectories are as individual as the bodies and as opaque to meaning, which is always general. Thus one cannot "evoke" them (like the "spirits" and voices of earlier ages) except in the way Marguerite Duras has presented "the film of voices": "Voices of women . . . they come from a nocturnal, elevated space, from a balcony overhanging the void, the totality. They are linked by desire. Desire each other. . . . Do not know we exist. Do not know that people hear them." *Destroy, she said*: "Writing has ended."¹²

Even philosophy, from Deleuze's *Anti-Oedipus* to Lyotard's *Libidinal Economy*, has labored to hear these voices again and thus to create auditory space. This is a reversal that is leading psychoanalysis to pass from a "science of dreams" to the experience of what speaking voices change in the dark grotto of the bodies that hear them. The literary text is modified by becoming the ambiguous depth in which sounds that cannot be reduced to a meaning move about. A plural body in which ephemeral oral rumors circulate: that is what this dismembered writing becomes, a "stage for voices." It makes the reduction of the drive to a sign impossible. It tends to create, as composer Maurice Ohana did in his composition *Cries for Twelve Mixed Voices*. One no longer knows what it is, if not altered and altering voices.

In scholarly writing, it is nothing other than the return of the voices through which the social body "speaks" in quotations, sentence fragments, the tonalities of "words," the sounds things make. "Those were my parents' words," says Helias, "those were my father's words":¹³ a voiced spell attached to bits of language. This glossolalia disseminated in vocal fragments includes words that become sounds again: for example, Marie-Jeanne "probably likes to use certain words for the sound that they make in her mouth and ears."¹⁴ Or noises that become words, such as "the noise" that the pinecone-toy (*cochon de pin*) makes when it twitches around on the floor.¹⁵ Or rhymes, counting jingles, *jibidis* and *jabadaos*, sound-envelopes of lost meanings and present memories:¹⁶

Hickory, dickory, dock,
The mouse ran up the clock.
The clock struck one,
The mouse ran down,
Hickory, dickory, dock.

Through the legends and phantoms whose audible citations continue to haunt everyday life, one can maintain a tradition of the body, which is heard but not seen.

These are the reminiscences of bodies lodged in ordinary language and marking its path, like white pebbles dropped through the forest of signs. An amorous experience, ultimately. Incised into the prose of the passage from day to day, without any possible commentary or translation, the poetic sounds of quoted fragments remain. "There are" everywhere such resonances produced by the body when it is touched, like "moans" and sounds of love, cries breaking open the text that they make proliferate around them, enunciative gaps in a syntagmatic organization of statements. They are the linguistic analogues of an erection, or of a nameless pain, or of tears: voices without language, enunciations flowing from the remembering and opaque body when it no longer has the space that the voice of the other offers for amorous or indebted speech. Cries and tears: an aphasic enunciation of what appears without one's knowing where it came from (from what obscure debt or writing of the body), without one's knowing how it could be said except through the other's voice.

These contextless voice-gaps, these "obscene" citations of bodies, these sounds waiting for a language, seem to certify, by a "disorder" secretly referred to an unknown order, that there is something else, something

other. But at the same time, they narrate interminably (it goes on murmuring endlessly) the expectation of an impossible presence that transforms into its own body the traces it has left behind. These quotations of voices mark themselves on an everyday prose that can only produce some of their effects—in the form of statements and practices.

Chapter XII Reading as Poaching

“To arrest the meanings of words once and for all, that is what Terror wants.”

Jean-Francois Lyotard, *Rudiments
paiens*

SOME TIME AGO, Alvin Toffler announced the birth of a “new species” of humanity, engendered by mass artistic consumption. This species-in-formation, migrating and devouring its way through the pastures of the media, is supposed to be defined by its “self mobility.”¹ It returns to the nomadic ways of ancient times, but now hunts in artificial steppes and forests.

This prophetic analysis bears, however, only on the masses that consume “art.” An inquiry made in 1974 by a French government agency concerned with cultural activities² shows to what extent this production only benefits an elite. Between 1967 (the date of a previous inquiry made by another agency, the INSEE) and 1974, public monies invested in the creation and development of cultural centers reinforced the already existing cultural inequalities among French people. They multiplied the places of expression and symbolization, but, in fact, the same categories profit from this expansion: culture, like money, “goes only to the rich.” The masses rarely enter these gardens of art. But they are caught and collected in the nets of the media, by television (capturing 9 out of 10 people in France), by newspapers (8 out of 10), by books (7 out of 10, of whom 2 read a great deal and, according to another survey made in autumn 1978, 5 read more than they used to),³ etc. Instead of an increasing nomadism, we thus find a “reduction” and a confinement: consumption, organized by this expansionist grid takes on the appearance of something done by sheep progressively immobilized and “handled” as a result of the growing mobility of the media as they conquer space. The consumers settle down, the media keep on the move. The only freedom

the "psychischen Apparat." The expression "theoretische Fiktion" refers particularly to "the fiction of a primitive psychical apparatus."

20. See Katherine S. Dreier and Matta Echaurren, "Duchamp's Glass 'La Mariée mise à nu par ses célibataires, même'. An Analytical Reflection," (1944) in *Selected Publications, III: Monographs and Brochure* (New York: Arno Press, 1972).

21. Alfred Jarry, *Les Jours et les nuits* (1897).

22. Jean-Claude Milner, *L'Amour de la langue* (Paris: Seuil, 1978), 98-112.

23. Michel Sanouillet, in Marcel Duchamp, *Duchamp du signe. Ecrits*, ed. M. Sanouillet (Paris: Flammarion, 1975), 16.

24. See Jean-François Lyotard, *Les Transformateurs Duchamp* (Paris: Galilée, 1977), 33-40.

11. "Quotations of Voices"

1. "Vox" (in praise of the voice) in the collection of poems entitled *Ingenii Familia*, which includes "Ingenium," "Liber," "Vox," "Memoria," and "Oblivio," in Gabriel Cossart, *Orationes et Carmina* (Paris: Cramoisy, 1675), 234.

2. Daniel Defoe, *Robinson Crusoe* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975), 162.

3. On this aspect of myth, see Claude Rabant, "Le Mythe à l'avenir (re)commence," *Esprit*, April 1971, 631-643.

4. See above, Chapter X, p. 133.

5. See Michel de Certeau, *L'Écriture de l'histoire*, 2nd ed. (Paris: Gallimard, 1978), 197-203.

6. See M. de Certeau et al., *Une politique de la langue* (Paris: Gallimard, 1975), 82-98, 110-121.

7. F. de Saussure, *Cours de linguistique générale*, ed. Tullio de Mauro (Paris: Payot, 1974), 30.

8. Tullio de Mauro's note, *ibid.*, 420.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 138-139; and also Cl. Haroche et al., "La Sémantique et la coupure saussurienne: Langue, langage, discours," *Langages*, No. 24 (1971), 93-106.

10. See D. Bertaux, *Histoires de vies ou récits des pratiques? Méthodologies de l'approche biographique en sociologie* (Paris: CORDES, 1976).

11. Louis Hjelmslev, *Prolégomènes à une théorie du langage* (Paris: Minuit, 1968), 139-142; *Prolegomena to a Theory of Language*, trans. F. J. Whitfield (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1968).

12. Marguerite Duras, *Nathalie Granger* (Paris: Gallimard, 1973), 105; and the interview by Benoît Jacquot, in *Art Press*, October 1973.

13. Pierre Jakez Helias, *Le Cheval d'orgueil* (Paris: Plon, 1975), 41 and 27.

14. *Ibid.*, 54.

15. *Ibid.*, 55.

16. *Ibid.*, 69-75.

12. "Reading as Poaching"

1. Alvin Toffler, *The Culture Consumers* (Baltimore: Penguin, 1965), 33-52, on the basis of Emanuel Demby's research.

2. *Pratiques culturelles des Français* (Paris: Secrétariat d'Etat à la Culture, S. E. R., 1974, 2 vols.

3. According to a survey by Louis-Harris (September-October 1978), the number of readers in France grew 17% over the past twenty years: there is the same percentage of people who read a great deal (22%), but the percentage of people who read a little or a moderate amount has increased. See Janick Jossin, in *L'Express* for 11 November 1978, 151-162.

4. See Jean Ehrard, *L'Idée de nature en France pendant la première moitié du XVIIIe siècle* (Paris: SEPVEN, 1963), 753-767.

5. François Furet and Jacques Ozouf, *Lire et écrire. L'Alphabétisation des Français de Calvin à Jules Ferry* (Paris: Minuit, 1977), I, 349-369, 199-228.

6. See for example J. Mehler and G. Noizet, *Textes pour une psycholinguistique* (La Haye: Mouton, 1974); and also Jean Hébrard, "Ecole et alphabétisation au XIXe siècle," Colloque "Lire et écrire," MSH, Paris, June 1979.

7. Furet and Ozouf, *Lire et écrire*, 213.

8. Michel Charles, *Rhétorique de la lecture* (Paris: Seuil, 1977), 83.

9. Jorge Luis Borges, quoted by Gérard Genette, *Figures* (Paris: Seuil, 1966), 123.

10. Charles, *Rhétorique de la lecture*, 61.

11. As is well known, "lector" was, in the Middle Ages, the title of a kind of University Professor.

12. See especially *Recherches actuelles sur l'enseignement de la lecture*, ed. Alain Bentolila (Paris: Retz CEPL, 1976); Jean Foucambert and J. André, *La Manière d'être lecteur. Apprentissage et enseignement de la lecture, de la maternelle au CM2* (Paris: SERMAP OCDL, 1976); Laurence Lentin, *Du parler au lire. Interaction entre l'adulte et l'enfant* (Paris: ESF, 1977); etc. To these should be added at least a portion of the abundant American literature: Jeanne Sternlicht Chall, *Learning to Read, the Great Debate . . . 1910-1965* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967); Dolores Durkin, *Teaching Them to Read* (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1970); Eleanor Jack Gibson and Harry Levin, *The Psychology of Reading* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT, 1975); Milfred Robeck and John A. R. Wilson, *Psychology of Reading: Foundations of Instruction* (New York: John Wiley, 1973); *Reading Disabilities. An International Perspective*, ed. Lester and Muriel Tarnopol (Baltimore: University Park Press, 1976); etc., along with three important journals: *Journal of Reading*, since 1957 (Purdue University, Department of English), *The Reading Teacher*, since 1953 (Chicago International Reading Association), *Reading Research Quarterly*, since 1965 (Newark, Delaware, International Reading Association).

13. See the bibliography in Furet and Ozouf, *Lire et écrire*, II, 358-372, to which we can add Mitford McLeod Mathews, *Teaching to Read, Historically Considered* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966). Jack Goody's studies